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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and describe the effects of the Middle 
East policies of Turkey and the European Union on mutual relations between the 
two actors with particular focus on the Arab Spring and its repercussions on 
regional stability and international relations. The key components of Turkey’s 
foreign policy are analyzed from the perspectives of EU-Turkey relations and 
political stances of Turkey and the European Union towards the Middle East. 
Analysis of Turkey’s and the EU’s responses to the uprisings and their impact on 
the situation in the region is an important part of the study. The conclusions of this 
study confirm that the strategic cooperation between the EU and Turkey and the 
necessity of compensating each other’s relative weaknesses in order to achieve 
similar foreign policy goals in the concerned region after the Arab Spring led to a 
rapprochement between the two actors. However, a direct influence of this 
rapprochement on the negotiation process regarding the future Turkish 
membership in the EU has not yet been observed. 
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Cílem této diplomové práce je popsat dopady zahraničních politik Turecka a 
Evropské unie směrem ke Střednímu východu na vzájemné vztahy obou aktérů. 
Zvláštním důraz ja kladen na význam vlivu Arabského jara na stabilitu v tomto 
regionu a na mezinárodní vztahy obecně. Jednotlivé složky zahraniční politiky 
Turecka jsou zkoumány jak z pohledu vztahu Evropské unie k Turecku tak z 
pohledu vztahů Turecka a Evropské unie k zemím Středního východu. Důležitou 
součástí práce je analýza reakcí Turecka a Evropské unie na povstání, která 
zahájila Arabské jaro, a jejich dopadů na situaci v regionu. Výsledky této analýzy 
potvrzují, že strategická spolupráce EU a Turecka a potřeba vzájemné 
kompenzace relativních "slabin" za účelem dosažení podobných zahraničně-
politických cílů v dotčeném regionu vedla ke sblížení obou aktérů v době po 
začátku Arabského jara. Vliv tohoto sblížení na vyjednávání ohledně budoucího 
členství Turecka v EU nicméně zatím nebyl pozorován. 
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Turecko, Evropská unie, vzájemné vztahy Turecka a EU, vyjednávání, Střední 
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more important than before not only for the region itself but also for the 
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for the regional economic integration, and protection of the environment. The 
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regional powers on regional and international politics. 
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1. Hypothesis: Turkey’s further interest in its Middle East policy especially 
after the Justice and Development Party presidency will lead to a significant 
rapprochement between Turkey and the regional countries.  
2. Hypothesis: This process is likely to influence Turkey’s foreign policy 
towards the European Union. 
3. Hypothesis: Turkey’s new foreign policy decisions and rapprochement with 
the Middle East will affect European Union’s perceptions about Turkey.   
4. Hypothesis: The European Union will feel much stronger necessity of 
collaboration with Turkey after the Arab Spring.  
The research profoundly integrates different resources and takes an inter-
disciplinary approach. The subject matter of the research is studied by 
exploring and systematically analyzing a broad range of written, visual and 
online media resources and academic papers. An extensive content analysis is 
used by taking into account the general lack of detailed empirical data 
concerning this research of interest. In this framework, an inductive approach is 
used through the analysis of the collected qualitative data. 
In order to explain the international issues related to Turkey-Middle East-EU 
triangle, political realism is selected as a school of thought in this research 
taking into account the most well-known approach of this theory that the world 
politics are driven by competitive self-interests of the states whose primary 
concern is survival.  
As argued by the realist scholars like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau and so 
many others the balance of power is the central mechanism for regulating 
conflict which is also the key issue in the Middle East as well as in between the 
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 The importance of providing with stability, prosperity, peace, and 
democracy in and out of the country has dramatically increased during the Cold 
War and in the following decades as the most well-known internal and external 
policy goals. The world has been facing an irreversible foreign policy change. 
Well-known identifications of security conceptions, foreign policy attitudes and 
basically international relations have been restructuring. In this atmosphere, the 
Middle East and Northern Africa have been given special attention by the Western 
World because of not only strategic importance of these regions in terms of critical 
resources but also security and defense perceptions of them.  
 September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States (US) in 2001 and 
afterwards the counterattacks of the US to Afghanistan and Iraq have doubled up 
the significance of the region. As a matter of fact, the biggest impact of events was 
observed on Turkey as a regional country surrounded by these incidents. With its 
strategically unique geographic location between Europe, the Middle East and 
Asia, and also with its proximity to the strategic regions and energy recourses 
Turkey has always been one of the most eye catching centers of both the 
countries located in the close neighborhood and of the countries located in 
Europe. 
 Turkey’s growing regional reputation in the Middle East and its diverging 
foreign policy decisions and above all the latest uprisings in all over the region 
have attracted the attention of the World much more strongly to the Middle East 
and particularly to Turkey. In the meantime, conversely, Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union have started to lose its intensity both in the eyes of political elite 
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and public. This has derived not only from Turkey’s internal or external policy 
decisions and their effects on these relations, but also the internal problems of the 
European Union such as the Euro crisis which has alienated the Union for a long 
while from the enlargement psychology without being directly related to Turkey. 
Indeed, this problematic period of relations has made much more interesting to 
study and analyze the effects and long-term results of the Arab Spring on Turkey-
EU relations.  
 Nowadays it has been frequently questioned whether the shift of axis in 
Turkish foreign policy mentioned above and deteriorations in Turkey-EU relations 
will increase after the uprisings, which is named as the Arab Spring, in the Middle 
East or these events in the region will provide a rapprochement between Turkey 
and the European Union. Meanwhile the discussions have mostly focused on the 
topic that whether the new regimes in the Arab world would follow Turkey as a 
model or not, because in each case the European Union will most probably 
develop a different policy.  
 The situation today in the region is crucial not only for intra-regional 
stability but also for the security and good neighborly relations of the European 
countries. The repercussions of these changes are multidimensional. The 
consequences of this process for the long-term distribution of power within the 
region and for the patterns of alliances among the regional powers are likely to be 
spectacular, although it has not been clearly visible, yet.    
 In this context, the motivation of this thesis is to analyze Turkey-EU 
relations in terms of the Middle East policies of these international actors, 
particularly after the uprisings in the Arab world.  
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Methodology and the Theory  
 The research profoundly integrates different resources and takes an 
inter-disciplinary approach. The subject matter of the research is studied by 
exploring and systematically analyzing a broad range of written, visual and online 
media resources and academic papers. An extensive content analysis is used by 
taking into account the general lack of detailed empirical data concerning this 
research of interest. In this framework, an inductive approach is used through the 
analysis of the collected qualitative data. 
 In order to explain the international issues related to Turkey-Middle East-
EU triangle, political realism is selected as a school of thought in this research 
taking into account the most well-known approach of this theory that the world 
politics are driven by competitive self-interests of the states whose primary 
concern is survival.  
 As argued by the realist scholars like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau 
and so many others the balance of power is the central mechanism for regulating 
conflict which is also the key issue in the Middle East as well as in between the 
Middle East and Europe today. 
 Moreover, when it is closely evaluated, it can be easily seen that Turkey 
has followed a realist foreign policy approach in the Middle East and tried to 
maximize Turkish national interests.  
 The main aim of this research is to explore the situation of Turkey-EU 
relations in the framework of the Middle East, to delve into the new order in the 
Middle East after the Arab Spring, and to analyze the impacts of cooperation 
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between regional powers on regional and international politics. In this general 
framework, in order to conduct this research, four hypotheses are formulated as 
followed; 
• Turkey’s further interest in its Middle East policy especially after the 
Justice and Development Party presidency will lead to a significant 
rapprochement between Turkey and the regional countries.  
• This process is likely to influence Turkey’s foreign policy towards the 
European Union. 
• Turkey’s new foreign policy decisions and rapprochement with the 
Middle East will affect European Union’s perceptions about Turkey.   
• The European Union will feel much stronger necessity of 
collaboration with Turkey after the Arab Spring.  
 In order to confirm these hypotheses, in the first chapter of the research, 
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government will be evaluated in the period of 
2002-2013. In this chapter, one of the most popular questions of current analyses 
related to Turkey will be addressed that if there is a shift of axis in Turkish foreign 
policy from being western oriented to being eastern oriented.  
 Additionally, under the two different subheadings of the first chapter, 
Turkey-EU relations and the current situation of the negotiation process, and also 
Turkey’s rapprochement policies towards the Middle East will be scrutinized.    
 In the second chapter, the EU’s foreign policy stance related to the 
Middle East will be analyzed and the emerging foreign policy interests from the 
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region, especially German, French and British ones, as the motive forces of the 
EU, will be shortly addressed.  
 In the third chapter, the Arab Spring and its regional repercussions will 
be discussed. Each country which is experiencing the uprisings in the Middle East 
and North Africa, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Morocco will 
be shortly studied. The main aim of this chapter is to have a general perception 
about the current situations of these countries after the uprisings, to have an idea 
regarding the impacts of their current situation on the regional and international 
relations, and additionally to see the effect of Turkish model in the newly 
established regimes.     
 In the fourth chapter, the multidimensional repercussions of the Arab 
Spring will be evaluated. In this context, first of all Turkey’s response and foreign 
policy decisions related to the  incidents of the region will be studied, and then the 
same points will be questioned for the European Union’s Middle East policy.  
 In this framework, EU development cooperation policy and the changes 
or effects in the EU-MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region economic 
relations will be considered during the uprising process and afterwards.  
 And in the fifth chapter, a comparative analysis of the implications of the 
Arab Spring on Turkey-EU relations will be discussed and it will be addressed 
whether this process has created a cooperation or competition atmosphere 
between these two international actors.  
 Finally in the conclusion part, taking into account the whole data that are 
obtained and the analyses that are made, a general confirmation for the 
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hypotheses will be submitted. Additionally, some general predictions will be 
determined in the conclusion related to the near future of the Turkish foreign 
policy, the new order in the Middle East, its repercussions on Turkey-EU relations 
and on the accession negotiations.     
Literature Review 
 The events occurring in the Middle East and North Africa crated an East-
West diversification particularly after the Cold War and 9/11 attacks and its long 
term consequences have become less clear, whereas in the middle of this 
diversification the importance of Turkey has become much more obvious (Tocci, 
2012: Protopapas, 2011; Cagaptay, Cornell, Lesser & Taspinar, 2011; Aydin, 
2005). As a traditional, as well as modern Muslim country, Turkey has always 
performed like a role model for the regional countries standing on its cultural and 
historical roots with the Middle East. In fact, with its religion, history and 
geography, Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, thus any event in the Middle East 
directly affects Turkey (Aydin, 2005).  
 As it is evaluated by so many scholars in the international relations 
domain, like Ronald Linden and some others, Turkey is an important regional 
player as well as being an important partner of the Western world. Thus, Turkey-
EU relations and foreign politics in general are mostly affected by Turkey’s 
regional role and its relations with the regional countries, and similarly EU’s 
decisions on Turkey, which were very disappointing currently, influence not only 
bilateral relations but also world politics (Linden et al., 2012; Cagaptay et al., 2011; 
Cakir et al., 2011). The reputation of Turkey has dramatically grown up currently 
also because of its transition process, the signals of which were first observed a 
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decade ago, reflecting a shift in foreign policy of Turkey from being western 
oriented to being eastern oriented (Tocci, 2012; Cagaptay et al. 2011).  
 Emerging alliances in between Turkey and the regional countries have 
been evaluated by some as a proof of this shifting policy of Turkey which might 
affect the Western world negatively; while by some it has been considered as an 
advantage of the European Union to renovate its policies towards the region with 
the help of close collaboration and consultation with Turkey during/after the Arab 
Spring which has contemporaneously emerged with Turkey’s foreign policy 
alteration (Freudenstein, 2011). 
 The Arab Spring has its own weight beyond Turkey-EU relations, too. 
The previous director of one of the most well-known institutes of the European 
Union, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Álvaro de Vasconcelos (2012) is 
identifying the uprisings as the ‘third democratic wave’  affecting the whole 
periphery of old Europe. De Vasconcelos states that this democratic wave came in 
different phases like the fall of the dictatorships in Europe (Portugal, Greece, and 
Spain) in the 1970s, then in Latin America and Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
finally in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. As a political uprising by masses 
demanding liberal democratic reform, Arab Spring has generated sweeping 
political change across the Arab world by following the previous phases.  
 The main conclusions of existing researches have so far focused either 
on the possible outcomes of the Arab Spring on foreign policy perceptions of the 
Western powers (Kaplan, 2012; Witney, 2012) or exclusively on the balance of 
power which will be established in the region after the Arab Spring (Barzegar, 
2012) without looking at specific regional powers. Although the existing studies 
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provide valuable input for international relations, there has been still a gap in the 
literature regarding a comprehensive analysis of the events from a 
multidimensional perspective taking Turkey as a center of gravity and analyzing its 
relations with the European Union in the shadow of these events. 
1. Remodeling Turkish Foreign Policy under the Rule  of AKP 
Government: ‘To the West or to the East’? 
 
 The Turkish Republic was born into a strategic geography harboring so 
many challenges alongside of opportunities in and beyond its borders. Providing 
national security, territorial integrity and political stability not only for its citizens but 
also for the wider geography surrounding the country have always been the main 
goals -from time to time main challenges- of Turkey.  
 In only few decades after the foundation of the Republic, new policy 
goals/challenges attached to the previous ones. The economic development, 
stabilizing secure energy resources and becoming a regional power, lead Turkey 
to turn its face towards the Western modernization. On this path, not long after 
and not surprisingly, to be the part of European community was chosen as the 
main foreign policy aim.  
 In fact, as a movement, westernization dates back to the period of the 
Ottoman Empire with the objective of being adopted by the West through 
implementing western norms and adapting its modern technology and life style. 
Thus, the strategic vision consisting of the EU membership can be evaluated as 
historical and natural outcome of both the Ottoman westernization tendency and 
“the founding philosophy of the Republic and Atatürk’s vision for the nation’s 
integration into Modernity and Civilization” (Özcan, 2010). 
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 When the Turkish foreign policy is being analyzed, these main pillars of 
foundation and policy goals should be kept in mind, because the policies followed 
until the 2000s were continuing in the same path. However, after 2000s although 
the main goals have not changed completely, the policies followed in order to 
achieve these goals have become multi-dimensional and from time to time 
confusing.  
 The foreign policy of the AKP government had set out on a ‘zero 
problems with neighbors’ policy, in fact by following the very well-known motto of 
Ataturk ‘Peace at home. Peace in the World’. Through this policy it had been 
argued that Turkey would mediate between regional countries on conflicting 
issues. This main foreign policy perception and related initiatives did not create 
any question mark in the West, particularly in the European Union, at beginning.  
 On the contrary, it was faced with an appreciation in the West with the 
expectation of much powerful impetus in the Middle East for peace and stability.  
But, unfortunately, some policies conducted afterwards such as voting against 
sanctions on Iran at the United Nations have paved the way for increasing doubts 
in the West about an ‘axis shift’ in Turkey (Cornell, 2011).     
 Although it has been stated by the AKP government so many times that 
Turkey’s Westernization perspective and membership desire towards the EU is a 
natural outcome of the centuries-long relations, common understandings and 
values with Europe such as democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law, the policies conducted by the government has been 
consisting of so many controversies. There have been, of course, critically 
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important international incidents causing or requiring these new controversial and 
multi-dimensional policies.   
 In a dramatically shaken world order, witnessing the United States’ 
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan just after the 9/11 attacks, increasingly going 
on conflicts in the Middle East between Palestine and Israel, and long-lasting 
disappointments and complications in relations with the European Union, Turkey 
has started to experience an attempt to create a modern version of political Islam 
and Neo-Ottomanism in addition to its old pro-Western and pro-European 
perspectives (Cichocki, 2009).  
 Neo-Ottomanism discussions were spread in a rapid succession when 
its signals were largely given by the policy briefs of the AKP government, even 
though this ideology of promoting further engagement with the neighbors and with 
the areas once belonged to the Ottoman Empire was first mentioned by the 8th 
President of the Turkish Republic Turgut Özal.  
 According to Özal and his ideology Neo-Ottomanism or mostly called 
Özalism, “(…) western civilisation was not the only civilisation on earth, and that 
Turkey did not have to choose between either the European, Turkish or Islamic 
civilizations (…) the Turks were European Muslims; therefore Turkey did not need 
to change its mentality or civilisational mode to be European” (Laciner, 2009).  
 Taking its roots from this political thinking ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, the AKP 
government focused on softening the approach to secularism and solving the 
Kurdish problem through re-direction of its diplomacy, economy, cultural and 
historical roots during its first terms, but this ideology could only be active in the 
Middle East (Criss, 2010). 
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 Meanwhile, the need to search for new export markets  became a critical 
driver of Turkish foreign policy, which had also emerged in the 1980s when “the 
economy had become transformed from a state-led and protected economy to an 
open economy with a growing manufacturing and service sector” (Kirişci, 2006: 
13). Under the ruling of Justice and Development Party (AKP) this tendency has 
made a dramatic ascent. Turkey’s turning face towards the Middle East should 
also be understood from this point of view (Barkey, 2011). 
 Additionally, the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) of the United 
States in the region, which was characterizing an alteration in the American policy 
through an active participation in promoting liberal democracy, market economies 
and educational reforms, provided an opportunity and also US support for Turkey 
to pursue a pro-active foreign policy (Bağcı & Sinkaya, 2007).  
 Nevertheless, bilateral relations between Turkey and the US had passed 
through a turbulent time when the Turkish National Grand Assembly rejected a 
decision that was anticipating opening the Turkish territory to the US forces to use 
it during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Ibid.). 
 In the framework of this general perspective, in this chapter of the 
research firstly, Turkey’s relations with the European Union will be scrutinized in 
the term of the AKP government. There is no doubt to state that the most 
prominent political improvements in Turkey-EU relations have been observed 
during the Justice and Development Party government’s tenure from 2002 to 
today.  
 The first and the most distinctive ones of these improvements is, without 
a doubt, the EU membership negotiation process of Turkey which was started in 
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2005. Keeping this in mind, AKP governments domestic policies will be analyzed 
in the framework of the EU norms and regulations.  
 After looking upon the wave like relations of Turkey and the EU, 
secondly, Turkey’s rapprochement with the Middle East during the same process 
will be analyzed with the most featured policy decisions of Turkey towards the 
region such as connecting close economic relations with Syria (until the Arab 
Spring), Egypt and Saudi Arabia; strong support for Hamas; and on the contrary 
tightening relations with Israel. 
1.1. Wavelike relations with the European Union 
 As an associate member of the European Community since 1963, 
Turkey applied for full membership to the European Union in 1987. In 1997 it was 
declared by the European Union as eligible to join the Union and just two years 
after that it became a candidate country in Helsinki European Council in 1999.  Its 
accession negotiations with the European Union were started in 2005. But 
unfortunately, for the last few years Turkey-EU relations have almost come to a 
stopping point.  
 The reasons behind the situation are in a wide variety, such as Cyprus 
issue, French opposition and as well as Turkish foreign policy decisions against 
the everlasting negotiation process with the EU about the membership to the 
Union. Indeed, as described by Öniş (2008), Turkey-EU relations since 2000s, 
under the rule of AKP government should be analyzed in two different periods, the 
first of which covers the period of 2002-2005 (AKP’s victory and start of accession 
negotiations) ‘Golden Age of Europeanization’, and the second of which is the 
post-2005 period.  
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 During the first period, Turkey pursued its active policy towards the 
European Union that had started in 1999 through the candidate status of the 
country when the previous government (DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition) was governing 
the country. In the contrary, during the second term Turkey has lost its enthusiasm 
about joining the EU as a full member.  
 Since the beginning of negotiation process in 2005 Turkey has been 
expected to fully adopt the EU acquis to its own legal system. The process of 
negotiations consists of thirty five different fields range from free movement of 
goods, fisheries, energy, external relations to foreign, security and defense policy. 
In order to reach the Accession Treaty, as any other candidate country, each 
chapter has to be opened by the EU Council and provisionally closed which 
requires fulfillment of closing criteria.  
 If all the chapters are closed after the negotiation process, then the 
Accession Treaty is signed between the EU and the candidate state. But, of 
course the treaty has to be approved both by the EU Parliament and each of the 
member state in the Union prior to membership.   
 According to the latest data of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry for EU Affairs (see the official web pages); only one negotiation chapter 
‘(25) Science and Research’ has opened and provisionally closed, and twelve 
chapters have opened ‘(4) Free Movement of Capital, (6) Company Law, (7) 
Intellectual Property Law, (10) Information Society and Media, (16) Taxation, (18) 
Statistics, (20) Enterprise and Industrial Policy, (21) Trans-European Networks, 
(27) Environment, (28) Consumer and Health Protection, (32) Financial Control, 
(12) Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy’; but have not closed, yet.  
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 On the other hand, eight chapters which are ‘(1) Free Movement of 
Goods, (3) Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, (9) Financial 
Services, (11) Agriculture and Rural Development, (13) Fisheries, (14) Transport 
Policy, (29) Customs Union, and (30) External Relations’ cannot be opened 
because of the EU Council decision in 2006 (see Council decision 2006/35/EC). 
 This decision requires a fully implementation of the Additional Protocol of 
the Ankara Agreement (1963 / 1970) to all EU Member States including Cyprus, 
and Turkey has not undertaken its obligations stemming from this protocol in its 
entirety. Briefly, it necessitates Turkey to open its ports to Greek Cypriot 
Administration of Southern Cyprus as required by the Customs Union with the EU.   
 Moreover, ten chapters ‘(2) Freedom of Movement for Workers, (11-F) 
Agriculture and Rural Development, (15) Energy, (17-F) Economic and Monetary 
Policy, (22-F) Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments, (23) 
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, (24) Justice, Freedom and Security, (26) 
Education and Culture, (31) Foreign, Security and Defense Policy, (33-F) Financial 
and Budgetary Provisions, and (34-F) Institutions’ have been blocked for political 
reasons by Cyprus, France, Germany and Austria. In this group German and 
Austria have explicitly refused to open the chapter related to free movement, 
France has refused to open five chapters (which are marked by “F”) for the reason 
that the opening of these chapters would imply a commitment to accession, and 
the rest have been refused to be opened by Cyprus (Insel, 2012). 
 Throughout 2011 the accession negotiations with the European Union 
continued very slowly without opening a new chapter. This process of stalemate 
brought about negative criticisms in different political and social groups in Turkey. 
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“Earlier in November 2011, EU Minister Bağış had suggested that Turkey would 
not lose anything if no additional chapters of the aquis were to be opened during 
the Cypriot Presidency” (Morelli, 2013: 9).   
 In 2012, taking into account the existing stalemate in relations and 
Turkey’s decision on freezing the relations during Cyprus’s presidency in the 
second half of the year, the European Union came with a new initiative called as 
‘positive agenda’. It was aimed with this initiative to bring new dynamics to the 
relations and to keep the accession process of Turkey alive and to give and 
impetus to them after a period of stagnation (see Europa Press Releases, 2012,  
MEMO/12/359).  
 In the framework of the initiative it has been decided to set up working 
groups that will work making progress in the accession process particularly related 
to the eight chapters which cannot be opened because of the Ankara Agreement 
and its additional protocol. The new initiative has evaluated from different 
perspectives by different group of scholars. For instance, for some it has the 
meaning of informal accession negotiation and for the others, particularly for EU 
skeptics, it has been something short of full EU membership (Morelli, 2013). 
 In the same period, the governmental bodies particularly the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted a comprehensive political and economic 
transformation of Turkey in addition to the realization of highest norms and 
standards in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and human rights (see web 
page Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Republic of Turkey).  
 However, 2012 Progress Report for Turkey, which has been published 
by the European Commission, has shown that Turkey has still long way to go. 
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Moreover according to Eralp (2012) the criticisms in the last Progress Report 
published by the EU Commission have been the harshest since the beginning of 
2000s (Eralp, 2012). The very-well expected result of it has been the weakening 
pro-EU coalition in Turkey on the grounds of cultural and political gridlock.   
 Meanwhile, in terms of the EU’s neighborhood policy towards the 
southern and south eastern neighbors, Turkey as a Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern country has taken an active role, since it is almost impossible to stay out 
of the regional initiatives. In this context, in a connection with the European Union, 
Turkey has been a member of the Barcelona Process since 1995.  
 Nevertheless, Turkey was reluctant to follow active policy in the region 
considering its long-term membership goals. During the first years, “Turkish 
diplomats feared that a stronger involvement in Euro-Mediterranean affairs could 
reinforce the arguments of those proposing Turkey should have strong ties with 
the EU but without full membership” (Lecha, 2009: 43).  
 Indeed, these doubts did not build on sand, because the Barcelona 
Process and the following neighborhood policy of the EU were predicting a closer 
collaboration and a privileged relationship between the regional countries and the 
EU without a perspective of membership. In this context, in 2007 when the France 
came up with the Union for Mediterranean (UfM) idea, Turkish politicians and 
diplomats took a strict political stance against it, since it was argued to be an 
alternative to Turkey’s full membership to the European Union.  
 The main reason behind the discomfort of Turkey towards this initiative 
was “the fact that UfM (was) the brainchild of Sarkozy, who (was) vocal about 
opposition to Turkey’s EU membership and whether Sarkozy’s ulterior motive was 
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to keep Turkey out of the EU by offering the backbone of the UfM instead” (Ozturk 
Erdem, 2011). 
 When some opposition increased also among the EU member countries 
itself such as Germany; France had to step back, and some structural changes 
were made in the UfM’s declaration. After getting confirmation that the UfM would 
not be an alternative to Turkish membership in the EU, Turkey has joined the 
Union for Mediterranean.  
 When the fluctuating Turkey-EU relations have been analyzed, it is also 
worth to mention the Lisbon Treaty and its impact on Turkey’s possible 
membership. Although the main purpose is to make the EU more democratic, 
more efficient and better able to address global problems, it has mainly changed 
the structure of the institutional hegemony in the Union by mostly focusing on 
voting system and rules (Karana, 2013).  
 According to Cichocki (2009), this treaty will make the membership 
possibility much more difficult for Turkey, because when it becomes a member the 
Treaty is going to allow Turkey an equal access to EU institutions in the decision-
making process by the double majority mechanism. With the population of 75 
million, Turkey might have become one of the main powerful actors in decision 
making mechanism as part of the population criterion in voting system.  
 Therefore, it would have made Turkey an equivalent partner to the 
biggest EU member states like Germany. There is no doubt that this does not 
seem a desirable scene in the European Union taking into account the current 
attitude of the powerful EU member countries. 
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 However, as it is pointed out by Insel (2012) France, during the 
presidency of François Hollande, quite the contrary of Nicholas Sarkozy, can play 
a different role in accession negotiations with Turkey and this can bring about a 
lasting normalization of relations.  
 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius’s explanations about 
French positive stance towards resuming on the accession negotiations, and first 
of all starting with the chapter of (22) Regional Policy have demonstrating this 
expectation on normalization of relations. Nevertheless, it is too early to predict the 
normalization and improvement in the relations of Turkey and the European Union 
after a couple of years-stalemate.   
 Obviously, whole this process should not be evaluated from one side’s 
perspective only. There are also mistakes done by the European Union. As 
emphasized by Cornell (2011), “since Turkey began negotiating for EU accession 
in 2005, opposition to its membership has not only grown in Europe, but also 
become ever more clearly articulated in terms of Turkey’s identity rather than its 
performance: centering, that is, on the question of whether the country is in fact at 
all European”.  
 This attitude towards Turkey triggered the negative feelings emerging in 
the Turkish society related to polarization between the West and the East. It has 
been pointed out by Taspinar (2011) that this alienation may somehow create 
‘Turkish Gaullism’ through an exclusively Islamist, nationalist, independent, self-
confident foreign policy and this may pave the way for a total pull out from the 
European or in general Western cooperation and collaboration initiatives as well 
as organizations.    
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 Meantime, the global financial crisis was dramatically experienced in the 
European Union. It reduced the European market which considerably affected 
both internal and external relations of the Union. Turkey-EU commercial relations 
were affected by this crisis and subsequently weakened, and so this situation was 
accompanied by an intensified economic cooperation with the Middle Eastern 
countries (Cichocki, 2009).   
 Although in between these regions Turkey has tried to form a bridge in 
terms of economic and political relations possessing historical and cultural ties 
both with Europe and the Middle East. For example, before 2011 the trade volume 
in between the European Union and Turkey was around 17 billion USD. It was 
covering almost half of Turkey’s whole foreign trade. However since 2011 Turkey’s 
neighborhood has taken the leadership among foreign trade partners of Turkey 
and trade volume between Turkey and its neighborhood has dramatically 
increased reaching around 82 billion USD (Kirişci, 2012).   
 Without a doubt, whole this wave like relations with the EU and long-
lasting disappointment emerging from the EU’s reluctance towards Turkey’s 
accession has created an alienation and loss of enthusiasm among Turkish 
society about the EU membership.  
 This situation was stated by Turkish President Abdullah Gül in May 2011 
that the Turkish people may say “no” to the EU membership because of that 
dramatic slowdown in relations (Fabry, 2013).  
 Meanwhile the Arab Spring has erupted in the neighborhood of both 
Turkey and the European Union, which has been expected to affect the 
negotiation and accession process. Since, as far as the political geography is 
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concerned, it is not surprising that with its religion, history and geography, Turkey 
is a Middle Eastern country, thus any event occurring in the Middle East directly 
affects Turkey (Aydin, 2005).  
1.2. Rapprochement with the Middle East  
 Nowadays, it has been mostly argued by international studies’ scholars 
that in the 21st century, particularly under the rule of the AKP government, 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East reflects a “Neo-Ottoman” 
tendency. It means a more activist policy in foreign relations, and also much more 
political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural influence in the region where Turkey 
has strategic and national interests (Criss, 2010; Cagaptay, 2009; Taspinar, 
2008). When Turkey’s increasing attention towards the Middle Eastern and 
Northern African countries during the AKP government is taken into account, it is 
highly likely to get this impression.  
 As a country located at the very center of the Balkans, the Middle East, 
the Caucasus and the Persian Gulf square, Turkey reflects a multi cultural and 
multi ethnic structure. Its politically strategic location in between Europe and Asia, 
as well as its critical proximity to political conflicts occurring in the neighborhood 
leave Turkey no choice but to follow its policies much more cautiously in foreign 
politics.  
 With this point of view, Turkey had pursued its relations with the Middle 
Eastern and Northern African countries in a limited and passive perspective until 
the 21st century. It is worth to state that during the Cold War and a long time even 
afterwards Turkey was in a struggle for getting an acceptation from the Western 
world as an international, western, modern, and above all a ‘European’ country.  
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 With this foreign policy goal, especially during the Cold War years 
relations with the neighbors in the Middle East were mostly ignored, and as 
mentioned above the contacts with the regional countries remained at a minimum 
level despite the historical and geographical connection with the region.  
 It is very well summarized by Arı and Pirinççi (2010: 1) that; “(…) the 
West and/or Westernization had been basic policy orientation for Turkey in terms 
of security and political considerations, (…) the security situation stemmed from 
the structure of international system imposed Turkey to take the Western 
consideration in dealing the problems in the Middle East”.  
 After the end of the Cold War, when the perceptions about Soviet threat 
were eliminated Turkey started to engage in regional politics and this trend 
continued in the following years, however desires for being a member of the 
Western society and especially being a part of the European Union had always 
been preponderant.       
 There is no doubt that Turkey is an important role model with its 
moderate Islam perception in the Middle East, and a desirable partner for the 
countries in the region with its rapidly developing economy (Tocci, 2012; 
Protopapas, 2011; Cagaptay, Cornell, Lesser & Taspinar, 2011).  
 Over and above Turkey shares a common cultural, religious and 
historical heritage with the regional countries which strengthen its leading role as a 
model symbolizing the importance of common values. The domination of the 
Ottoman Empire, which governed a good deal of Arab land for more than four 
centuries, has played a significant role in forming these common values. 
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 It can be said that, the remarkable changes in foreign policy of Turkey 
towards the Middle East started at the end of 90s, especially during the Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem’s tenure (Bolat, 2012). In this period significant 
initiatives were embarked on especially in Palestine-Israel issue, as well as in 
relations with Syria.  
 However, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to 
power in Turkey, this involvement started to increase dramatically. Since the first 
day of its authority in the country, the AKP government has based its foreign policy 
stance on regional stability, national unity and territorial integrity (Arı & Pirinççi, 
2010). At the beginning, these foreign policy goals were not astonishing at all, 
because they had been addressed several times by previous governments since 
the foundation of the Republic.  
 Nevertheless, following rapprochement with the Middle Eastern 
countries, besides the unprecedented foreign policy self confidence of Turkey has 
suddenly attracted attention of the World to Turkey and to its regional growth. 
Before focusing on its deeply rooted reasons, it is worth to state that one of the 
main concerns of the Western world was the AKP government’s Islamic structure 
despite that fact that it was called as moderate Islam.  
 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (2008) was stating this 
transition as a positive foreign policy development in every platform through 
making a foreign policy analysis and he was explaining the reasons behind 
Turkey’s further involvement in foreign policy issues especially in the Eastern 
neighborhood as following:  
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 “After the end of Cold War in the early 1990s, a new notion of Turkey 
emerged as a bridge country (…) Turkey maintained its stability amid the chaos 
that engulfed many of its near neighbors and the international community began 
to look to Turkey as an island of stability and a bridge country between east and 
west (...) In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space.  
 As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may 
be denied as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be 
reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey 
cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single 
region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of 
maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area 
of influence in its immediate environs.” 
 With these above mentioned facts and understanding, foreign policy 
decisions of Turkey have never been taken alone on the basis of internal 
situations or political attitudes of elected power in Turkey. Balance of power in the 
World politics, and security and stability in regional politics have gradually affected 
decision making mechanism in Turkey.  
 Due to the fact that, as stated by Taspinar (2008), after the 9/11 attacks, 
the United States paid further importance to Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy 
orientation and tended to present Turkey as a role model for the Islamic world. 
Thus, since taking over the authority, AKP government’s foreign policy has been 
based on the concept of ‘strategic depth’.  
 This policy stance has implied the necessity of redefinition of Turkey’s 
strategic depth from the perspective of connections with the neighbors and the 
25 
 
continent in general. It has also required a reevaluation of the geo-economic and 
geo-cultural dimensions of the parameters of foreign policy in a comprehensive 
manner.  
 As stated by Joshua W. Walker (2007: 34), “Beyond the academic 
discussions surrounding Turkey’s potential and place in the world, Strategic Depth 
advocates seeking to counterbalance Turkey’s dependencies on the West by 
courting multiple alliances to maintain the balance of power in its region”.  
 Basically, he argues that according to the strategic depth policy Turkey 
should actively seek ways to balance its relationships and alliances without 
depending upon any one actor, which will prove Turkey with independence and 
leverage on the global and regional stage.   
 As a reflection of the strategic depth concept and its pillar ‘zero problems 
with neighbors’ policy, between the years 2002 and 2010 Turkey maintained close 
relations with the neighbors in the Middle East and Northern Africa. For instance, 
just after the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections, official 
representatives of Hamas were invited to Turkey in order to seek ways of 
mediation between Hamas and Israel, which has created a shock effect in Israel 
and also in some Western countries (Taspinar, 2008).  
 Meanwhile Turkey-Syria relations were improved in the fields of 
economy and regional relations. Turkey sought new investment opportunities in 
Syria and in this framework a Free Trade Agreement was signed between two 
countries in 2007 and visa regime was abolished opening doors to visitors from 
both sides in 2009. Moreover, Turkey mediated peace talks between Syria and 
Israel in 2008. 
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  Although this collaboration process looked like serving to improve 
bilateral relations, one of the main reasons behind was Turkey’s growing unrest 
related to the American support to Iraqi Kurds in order to stabilize Iraq but no 
support to Turkey in order to fight against PKK terrorism (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010). 
 In fact, this hidden political reaction has one more time proved the reality 
that in international relations, no matter if it is a state or an international 
organization; an actor has usually behaved according to the national or 
supranational interests.      
 Another improvement was observed in Turkey-Saudi Arabia relations 
during these years. For the first time in the forty years history of relations, King 
Abdullah’s visit to Turkey in 2006 added a new dimension to the economic and 
diplomatic relations (Taspinar, 2008).  
 Similarly, Turkey-Egypt rapprochement has been mostly described as a 
‘regional alliance’ during the AKP government. First of all, a free trade agreement 
was signed in 2005, which has increased the trade exchange between Turkey and 
Egypt. Furthermore the ‘Memorandum for a Framework for Turkish-Egyptian 
Strategic Dialogue’ was signed in 2007 (Taha, 2012). 
 As a result of these growing economic relations between Turkey and 
regional countries the "Close Neighbors Economic and Trade Association Council" 
was established by Turkey together with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The aim of 
this Council has been to establish a free trade area among these countries (Üstün, 
2012).  Meanwhile, Turkey has started to play an active role in the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference, and Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu has been elected as the 
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9th Secretary General by the 31st Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) 
in 2005.  
 Above mentioned improvements in regional relations caused new 
discussions about Turkey’s global role and its shifting nature from a Western geo-
strategic military deterrent to an exemplary model of a Muslim-majority, secular, 
and democratic nation (Walker, 2007). However, this rapprochement process has 
not only been emerged by shifting Turkish policies.  
 Simultaneously, regional actors, “especially Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Iran, and Iraq realized that cooperation through bilateral and multilateral 
channels would serve best on behalf of their interests” (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010: 7).  
 Briefly, although with the new attitude of AKP government in foreign 
politics Turkey has reflected a shift towards the East than the West, and its role 
has evolved from being a bridge between West and East to being a role model in 
the Middle East maintaining productive relations in the region; this stance has 










2. Policy Stance of the European Union towards the Middle East: 
    ‘Particularly of the Selected EU Member States’   
 
 The main goal of the European Union, since the beginning, has been to 
protect peace and stability in Europe and to prevent any social, economic or safety 
related threat to its presence and order as much as possible. Especially after the 
end of the Cold War, when the obvious threat perception stemming from the 
Soviet Union was eliminated, this goal has mainly focused on the neighboring 
regions in the south and southeast which means into the Middle East and North 
Africa.  
 From this point of view, stability, economic prosperity, security and social 
conditions in these regions have become critically important. Therefore, the 
Mediterranean region has always been one of the priorities of the European Union 
regarding regional cooperation, trade liberalization through bilateral association 
agreements, possibilities of diverging dynamics of southern Mediterranean 
countries with European norms, and regional economic and social gap (Lecha, 
2011).  
 The EU’s relations with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean and 
the Middle East have been developed through the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EUROMED) which can be identified as a regional forum for political, 
economic and social cooperation.  
 It was established by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 and the main 
goal of the partnership was announced as to create a shared zone of security, 
stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. With the aim of providing these main 
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goals, in three main fields a cooperation framework (Malmvig, 2006) was 
established which were;  
• Political and security cooperation, which was based on fundamental 
principles of human rights and democracy. 
• Economic cooperation, which was accompanied by substantial 
financial support from the EU structural reforms. 
• Social and cultural cooperation, which was based on development of 
an active and pluralistic civil society. 
 But unfortunately the policies followed by the EU in the framework of the 
Barcelona Process and the discourse used by it, were almost completely different 
than each other. For instance, while the regional countries were invited by the EU 
to cooperate and move together towards the common security threats such as 
terrorism and radical Islam; the economic system and unstable political structures 
of these countries were defined as the security challenges by the EU (Ibid.). 
 When the obstacles and problems started to be more visible in the 
system, a new initiative was introduced to the international society in 2004. It was 
argued by the EU that the partnership goals were solidified with this new initiative 
‘the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)’ engaging countries along its periphery 
(Czekaj, 2011). It was supposed to bring a new impetus to the relations in the 
south and south east whereas combining different neighborhood policies from the 
east and from the south of the Union.     
 The policy has based on four dimensions which are ‘political and security 
dialogue; economic and financial partnership; social, cultural and human 
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partnership; and migration’ (Akşit & Üstün, 2009). In this framework, in order to 
realize four dimensions; reinforcement of security through defining a common 
peace and stability area, establishment of a free-trade area thorough making 
financial cooperation and rapprochement among cultures through encouraging 
cultural and social exchanges between societies have been chosen as main policy 
goals.   
 Meanwhile, the region has been supported by the development 
cooperation of the European Union, funds of which are provided by the EU budget 
and the European Development Fund. The tasks of the development cooperation 
include the following fields (Bonk, Kerl & Zach, 2007); 
• Long-term bilateral cooperation with local governments through direct 
budget support, 
•  Multilateral development cooperation through financial contributions 
to international organization,  
• Co-financing of non-governmental organizations within and outside 
the EU, 
• Short-term humanitarian aid.  
 However, for the last few years especially after the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 by the United States, the EU’s confusing policies towards the Middle East 
have frequently been criticized. It has been argued that the EU has not clear 
policies towards the region.  
 For instance; “In the recent Iraq war, while some EU members, most 
notably Britain, joined the coalition forces led by the United States (US), other EU 
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members such as Germany and France preferred not to involve in the war” (Dagci, 
2007). 
 From the perspective of Barcelona Process and the Neighborhood 
Policy, the EU was increasingly facing oppositions by policy makers in the 
meantime because of failing to be effective or capable to react to the events in the 
region, ambiguity of the action plans and limited funding allocation for promotion of 
human rights and democracy (Akşit & Üstün, 2009).  
 One of the main criticisms was based on double standard claims which 
were arguing that while the European Union was providing a liberal democracy in 
its own borders defining common interests and values, the same common 
understanding and expectation was not pursued for the neighborhood.  
 Therefore  “instead of an equal partnership between two distinct blocs of 
states, what emerged was a ‘hub and spokes’ arrangement between the EU on 
the one hand and individual MPCs (Mediterranean Partner Countries) on the 
other, with the EU setting the pace and the southern states responding bilaterally” 
(Hollis, 2012: 83). 
 Above all these criticisms, the biggest obstacle in front of a properly 
functioning mechanism was that “despite the fact that democracy and human 
rights are part of the very aquis of the Barcelona Process, the EU has in practice 
often chosen immediate security concerns and strategic stability over concerns for 
democracy and human rights” (Malmvig, 2006: 343). In order to eliminate these 
criticisms, Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched in 2008  which 
consists of 27 EU member countries together with Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.  
 With the UfM, the European Union and Northern African countries jointly 
undertook some commercial projects in the fields of transport, energy and 
environment. Although, as a new strengthened initiative, the UfM has aimed to 
enhance multilateral relations, to carry out more concrete projects and also to 
make the process more visible for citizens, the critics have continued owing to the 
same reasons mentioned above.  
 Hollis (Ibid.: 81) has been criticizing this general EU stance towards the 
Middle East with these words; “For over two decades the EU has been promoting 
and justifying its policies on the grounds that they will help create ‘shared 
prosperity’ and more jobs for all the countries of the Mediterranean. Yet persistent 
and gross disparities in wealth and high unemployment were among the 
grievances that triggered the Arab revolts in 2010–11. And, while declaring its 
commitment to promoting human rights and democracy, by its actions the EU has 
favored regimes and practices that ultimately proved intolerable to a broad stratum 
of Arab society”. 
 Beyond the political and economic policy stance of the European Union 
towards the Arab world, its attitude towards Islam is also worth to be analyzed due 
to the growing tendency by many Europeans for Muslims which is affecting the 
general decision making processes of the European Union. As it is pointed out by 
De Vasconcelos (2012), this attitude creates an anti-Islamic xenophobia and a 
rejection of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries and unfortunately it is a 
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handicap for European foreign policy because it damages the soft power of the 
EU.  
 Foreign and security policy decisions in the European Union are taken 
by unanimity which means that all member states have equal power in decision-
making mechanism. But of course in reality the system does not function that 
equally. Especially in today’s power oriented relationships are considered, it might 
be easily commented that the economic, political, military, and diplomatic capacity 
of a member state plays an important role in decision-making mechanism and it 
mostly determines its influence in the EU (Lehne, 2012).   
 Thus, we can say without a doubt that the biggest powers of the 
European Union, who are leading the internal and external policies, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom have attracted much more attention than the 
other member countries in terms of the Union’s foreign policy decisions about the 
Middle East. “Their involvement in the most important forums of multilateral 
diplomacy and their comprehensive approach gives the Big Three enormous 
influence in shaping the EU’s foreign policy decisions” (Ibid.). Therefore, under the 
following subheadings these three countries’ foreign policy approaches towards 
the Middle East will be analyzed with the main topics.     
2.1. Germany 
 It is a well-known fact that not only with its economic potential but also 
with its political force, Germany is one of the most important driving forces in the 
European Union. The influence of Germany was always obvious in the Union, 
however, it has become much more visible in 2000s through the turbulences 
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occurred in the World, particularly in Europe, such as financial crises, security 
concerns related to international terrorism and particularly the processes starting 
with the war in Iraq in 2003.  
 Just following the war in Iraq in 2003, Angela Merkel took the office as 
German Chancellor in 2005. With this term, it was expected that Germany-US 
relationships and partnership (if necessary) would be improved in order to efface 
the criticisms directed to Germany during the invasion of Iraq because of its 
opposition, which had also directly affected the EU.  
 As expected, Germany has started to follow a further multilateral policy 
about the Middle East especially about the Israeli-Palestinian dispute by 
supporting the engagement of the leaders of Syria and Iran in the process in order 
to initiate a region-wide effort as it has been also doing the same about the future 
status of Iraq (Belkin, 2009).   
 When general stance of Germany toward the Middle East is observed, 
firstly, it should be said that since the beginning of 2000s Germany has supported 
a much more effective and stronger EU role in the Middle East Peace Process 
(MEPP), and has actively contributed to EU missions in Palestinian territories and 
Gaza Strip (Mueller, 2007).  
 Additionally, it has been supporting a comprehensive cooperation 
framework between the EU and the regional countries with the concern that 
economic or political problems in the region might cause turbulences and soft 
security threats, and might trigger the historical frictions, and thus Germany might 
be affected by these frictions even if indirectly.     
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 Similarly, EU-MENA relations have also started to be backed by 
Germany since the 2000s, as opposite to German attitude in 1995 and 1996 when 
the Barcelona Process was launched. For instance, at the end of 1990s “Germany 
actively contributed to European efforts which aimed at the creation of an Euro-
Mediterranean area of peace and stability” (Ibid.: 9).   
 Relationships with Israel have traditionally been at the centre of 
Germany’s foreign policy toward the MENA region. Although it is mostly argued 
that Germany always tackles the issue with an objective understanding (Grohe, 
Moosbauer, Perthes & Sterzing, 2002), there is a main German benefit of a 
peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Germany has a sense of moral 
responsibility about Israel due to the mass murder of European Jews in the 
Second World War, thus, the recognition of Israel’s inviolable right to exist became 
a core principle of German foreign policy (Overhaus, 2002).  
 Providing peace between two sides is important for Germany, not only to 
eliminate fear of a conflict in its relations with Israel, but also to pursue its good 
relations with the Arab states. In this context, it provides financial assistance to 
Palestine more than any other European country as well as providing economic 
and technical aid to Israel, but it also stipulates some conditions in return such as 
being a democratic state, respect to human rights and cooperate peacefully with 
its neighbors (Grohe, Moosbauer, Perthes & Sterzing, 2002). 
 Thus, German foreign policy perception regarding the Middle East 
depends on to prevent Arab-Israeli conflict and in general insecurity spillovers 
such as illegal migration, proliferation of WMDs or radical movements from the 
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MENA region to Europe and its immediate neighborhood with the cooperation of 
the EU and also to protect German commercial interests in the region. 
 When trade with the Middle East and North Africa has been considered, 
it may be stated that Germany is one of the main trading partners of the regional 
countries, even though from Germany’s side economic interests have been 
modest except for Libya and Algeria which are Germany’s main oil suppliers and 
Israel with which Germany makes one fifth of its whole exports to the region 
(Perthes, 2002). 
  In a nutshell, besides the EU general policy towards the Middle East, 
Germany puts considerable attention to the events in the region. Therefore, the 
uprisings in the Arab World have been closely observed by Germany since the 
beginning of events, because any event triggering hostility between Arabs and 
Israelis will most probably have impacts on Germany’s interests. 
2.2. France 
 France is also a significant driving force of the European Union in terms 
of the foreign policy stance of the Union in addition to the domestic policy 
decisions about the Union itself. As for France, the Middle East and North Africa, 
particularly Algeria, Syria and Lebanon have crucial importance because of its 
geographical proximity and historical-colonial ties with these countries.  
 When the improvements regarding France and its influence in the EU 
foreign policy in 2000s are scrutinized as done for Germany, it can be said that 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s Presidency in 2007-2012 has been of utmost importance. In his 
term Sarkozy had aimed “to increase France's influence and promote French 
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interests in the Middle East, by strengthening the European Union’s global role 
and by advancing initiatives such as the Common European Foreign and Defense  
Policy (CFDP)” and the Union for Mediterranean (UfM) (Hershco, 2008: 1).  
 Although in Sarkozy’s term France strongly supported further role of the 
EU in the Middle East, its own foreign policy stance towards the Middle East did 
not present bigger differences than before. As observed in the past, strong 
economic engagement was prolonged in Libya, Iraq, Syria, North Africa, the Gulf 
countries and Egypt, with mediation efforts in Lebanon, and meetings with Israeli 
and Palestinians leaders (Ibid.). About financial issues, France has always been 
the biggest investor in North Africa and particularly in Morocco, as well as being by 
far the biggest aid donor (Witney & Dworkin, 2012). 
  As pointed out by Hershco, the biggest difference was the civilian 
nuclear cooperation offer for Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, 
the United Arab Emirates and Morocco in order to deepen relations with the 
regional countries and also prevent any security threat which could have emerged 
from the region. Union for Mediterranean idea had also been created to deal with 
the issues such as counter-terrorism, immigration, energy, trade, water and 
sustainable development in 2008.  
 Additionally, in Arab-Israeli conflict, France has explicitly supported 
Palestinian authorities, which made a pick during the Yasser Arafat’s tenure 
(Hershco, 2005), but after Arafat’s demise and increasing evidences of the US-
Israel alliance forced France to follow much more neutral policy. 
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  In this context, French foreign policy devoted to the region stresses that 
the active diplomacy against terror and weapons of mass destruction should be 
the main tool for solving problems (Lakomy, 2012; Hershco, 2005). French 
resistance before the US invasion of Iraq was actually a clear example of this 
attitude. In this case, France had not taken part in the coalition group structured 
against Iraq in 2003.  
 In fact, until the Arab Spring, France-Middle East relations had also 
depended on personal relations with the Arab dictators, beyond a strong support 
for more powerful and active role of the European Union in the region, which 
caused a political complication and dilemma for France in reacting to the events at 
the beginning (Lakomy, 2012).  
 As many countries have experienced, these uprisings created 
contradictions for France, such as unpredictable results of the events, security 
threats stemming from general instability, migration possibility and deterioration of 
economic relations.  
2.3. The United Kingdom  
 Another powerhouse of the European Union is without a doubt is the 
United Kingdom since the beginning of its membership.   Even though the UK is 
geographically located furthest from the Middle East when compared to Germany 
or France, it shares the same historical and colonial ties with the region as in the 
case of France, and the same economy and security oriented interests with both 
Germany and France regarding the Middle East.  
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 However, the UK has followed diverging policies from Germany and 
France, and has tried to lead the European Union in its foreign policy decisions 
through its own perspectives. For instance, by differentiating from Germany and 
France, the UK had followed different policies regarding the invasion of Iraq, and 
strictly supported the US in her decisions. Meanwhile, it had followed an active 
policy as a ‘bridge’ between the US and the EU regarding the Middle East issues. 
 Similarly, contrary to German and French positive approach to more 
active EU presence in the Middle East, the UK prefers a much more conservative 
and limited EU in the region, because it is argued that a greater EU engagement 
in the region especially through the energy policies, development and 
improvement of oil production might enhance European stakes in the region, for 
instance in Iraq, while challenging the interests of the UK (Hofmann, 2010).  
 In terms of Arab-Israeli conflict, as an extension of maintaining the best 
possible relations with existing regimes because of it is closer economic and 
historical relations, the UK has pursued its relations with Israel at limited level. In 
this perspective, “Israel tends to be viewed as a cause of instability and anti-
Western feeling in the Arab world” (Rynhold, 2005). 
 Briefly, the main expectations of the UK from the region is to maintain 
the flow of oil, to combat radical terror, to provide security and stability in the 
Middle East, and as much as possible to prevent any prospective threat emerging 
from the region towards its own territory or citizens (Ibid.). Thus, the Arab Spring 
has created uncertain reactions also in the UK at the beginning. As a first step, 
economic sanctions were demanded, the assets were decided to frozen, and a 
NATO coordinated operation in Libya was strongly supported (Michou, 2012).  
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3. The Arab Spring and Its Regional Repercussions  
 The Arab Spring, as a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and 
protests in the Arab World, has been mostly described as a turning point in 
regional stability and balance of power of the Middle East and North Africa. 
Because before the aforementioned events the regional order had been provided 
through the well-known players, although they were  dictators for almost a half 
century or more, while the future state structures and general regional order have 
been still blurred after almost two years.  
 Nevertheless, it is pointed out by Barzegar (2012) that “the future of the 
balance of power in the region will embrace the rivalry of two blocs of players: the 
regional 4+1 which comprises four active and major regional players including, 
Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt plus Israel as a behind-the-scene player, 
which passively pursues its objectives through the channel of the United States”. 
 The Arab Spring movement originated in Tunisia in December 2010 
through Mohamed Bouazizi’s reaction to the police confiscation by setting himself 
on fire and in an incredibly short period spread all over the Middle East and 
Northern Africa, especially Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Morocco. As stressed 
by defence correspondent of The Independent Kim Sengupta that 2011 was a 
year of division and doubt in the Middle East and North Africa after the regime 
changes and hopes for freedom and justice (Nashashib, 2012).  
 There were various factors behind the uprisings of masses. With the 
words of Freudenstein (2011: 68), “the protests are a combination of demographic, 
socio-economic and political factors: an unprecedented number of young people 
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faced with stagnant, corrupt and repressive regimes, but also confronted with 
dismal prospects for their own economic future, decided to risk everything for the 
chance of the better”.  
 Although it seems that there are too many different reasons, what is 
exactly triggering the others creating a domino effect is ‘economic deadlock’. It is 
very well-known that the economic problems of the societies living in the region 
have been a reality for the centuries. While the administrative level was becoming 
richer and powerful, the rest of the population was becoming poorer with every 
coming year. Besides the policies of the totalitarian regimes, there were some 
external factors in this deterioration process.  
 For instance, as it is pointed out by Hollis (2012), through the Barcelona 
Declaration, tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade were removed in manufactured 
goods and this process was improved in an incredibly short period, while the same 
improvement could not be observed in agricultural products which were the main 
export of the North African states except energy. So, this situation was not for the 
benefit of Mediterranean countries but it was the benefit of the European Union.  
 Moreover, Hollis adds that “in terms of capital flows, the EMP did 
encourage investment in the MPCs, yet in the name of free market economics the 
MPCs were expected to open up their economies to European companies with the 
capacity to outperform local producers and so drive them out of business” (Ibid.: 
83). Besides the reasons, the implications of the Arab Spring on the regional 
countries and on general balance of power have also changed from one country to 
another according to the pre-uprising situation as well as the strength of the 
authority in the country. 
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 After all the uprisings and big turmoil in the region, unfortunately, the 
general situation and shaken order does not seem easily recoverable after two 
years.  The society in these countries has still giving unprecedented effort to 
provide what peoples expected at the beginning: ‘democracy’.  
 “Most countries in the Arab world have not jumped political tracks, and 
those that did begin to liberalize are now struggling to maintain order, lock in their 
gains, and continue moving forward” (Jones, 2013: 55). In this general framework 
it is useful to make an overview on the situation of some of the regional countries 
during and after the first impact of the Arab Spring and to make an analysis 
regarding the effects of Turkey on their new systems and also the effects of the 
EU on them.  
  In Tunisia, President Zine al-Abidine Ali resigned in 2011 and went into 
exile. At the end of the same year, the first democratic parliamentary elections 
were held in which the moderate Islamist Ennahda party won in a landslide. 
“Ennahda, which was banned under Ben Ali, says it has modeled itself on 
Turkey's governing AK Party” (see BBC World News, Arab uprising: Country by 
country – Tunisia).  
 However, the protests in the country have not come to an end, yet. 
Protests against the economic situation and demonstrations by secularists against 
the government, which is criticised by being too Islamist (despite being in coalition 
with liberals), have been going on.  
 Meanwhile, accusations of the government by Salafis of not being 
Islamist enough have been still continuing and creating new turbulences in the 
country (Nashashib, 2012).    
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 In Egypt Hosni Mubarak left the presidency in 2011. The elections were 
held in the same year and finalized with the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood 
which has been explicitly backed by the AKP government. In 2012 Mohammed 
Mursi was announced as the country's first freely elected president. But, 
unfortunately, “first democratically elected president (…) caused national outrage 
and division by behaving blatantly undemocratically, though public pressure forced 
Mohamed Mursi to rescind his decree placing himself above the law sooner than 
he promised” (Ibid.).  
 In the past, the Muslim Brotherhood faced oppression and now -being in 
power- it is likely to bring significant changes not only for Egypt itself but also for 
the rest of the Arab world (Turkone, 2012). Meanwhile, political and social life of 
Egypt suffers from growing polarization, and a number of ideological struggles 
divide the society, among the most important being those between Islamists and 
liberals, current government and opposition. 
 Compared to the other countries that experienced what is generally 
referred to as the Arab Spring, Egypt has made the most impressive progress so 
far. Even though the overall situation in the country does not live up to standard 
criteria of democratic governance yet and stability of the country has not been 
decisively established, the scope of changes that took place in Egypt after the fall 
of President Mubarak and after the victory of Islamist majority and Muslim 
Brotherhood has been enormous (Knell, 2012).  
 In international politics, Egypt has started to follow an active policy with 
all the regional and trans-regional players through engagement. In this context, it 
keeps close relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar because of financial support, 
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with Iran and Turkey in order to achieve regional political stability, while interacting 
with the United States, Russia, and China in an attempt to maintain a major role in 
the regional balance of power (Barzegar, 2012). 
 In Libya Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011 and in the same 
year he was killed by the rebels. In order to protect civilians in the country, a 
resolution authorizing necessary measures was passed in the UN Security Council 
in March 2011. Moreover, a NATO-led operation was conducted in the country.  
 In July 2012, elections were held and the General National Congress 
came to power in August 2012. The general order and security have not been re-
established, yet. One of the current terrifying examples of that was the killing of 
the US ambassador in Benghazi demonstrations in September 2012.  
 In Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh handed over the presidency to 
his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who is expected to pursue the presidency 
until 2014 presidential elections. Although it looks like the political order has been 
provided in the country, there have been serious problems waiting for a solution 
such as poverty, shrinking oil reserves, water shortage, high unemployment, Al-
Qaeda presence, tribal conflict, and a refugee influx from Somalia (Ibid.).  
 Violence has been still going on in the country and people are still 
suffering with the collapsed economy. Moreover, the country has been split to 
regions by different groups such as “a Shiite rebellion in the north, a secessionist 
movement and an al Qaeda insurgency in the south, and powerful militias and 
tribes in the substantial territory” (Jones, 2013).  
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 In Syria the uprisings have started in March 2011. The President Bashar 
al-Assad, who has the power since 2000, has been still standing against the 
opposition group; even though he has been called to resign by Turkey and Jordan, 
and he has been imposed sanctions by the US and the EU. “The opposition has 
come to control some isolated pockets of territory, particularly in the north-west of 
the country” (see BBC World News, Arab uprising: Country by country – Syria).  
 Meanwhile, Syria’s membership in the Arab League has been 
suspended. Since the beginning of the uprisings in Syria more than 60.000 people 
was killed. It has been argued by Nashashib (2012) that it has been the most 
destabilizing one in the region, because it has been affecting its neighbors 
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. 
 Protests in Morocco started in February 2011 and pave the way for some 
constitutional changes in July 2011. Elections were held in November in the same 
year, and Justice and Development Party as a moderate Islamist party won the 
elections. Although protesters want a full constitutional monarchy, with more 
powers transferred from the king, they have been not powerful enough. 
  As it can be followed by the above mentioned general situations of some 
of the regional countries, yet, the consequences of this process for the long-term 
distribution of power within the region and for the patterns of alliances among the 
regional powers remain unclear. In fact, until now, stable state structures and 
admired democratic orders could not have been properly organized. The clear 
thing is that there is a growing evidence for emergence of some regional axes 
such as between Turkey and Egypt. And the Arab spring showed one more time 
that The Gulf States were feeling confident about having Western backing which 
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had been ensured by their oil and gas wealth, security agreements and weapons 
sales (Nashashib, 2012). However, they have also experienced the impacts of the 
unrest in their countries. The main reason behind that, above all the economic and 
demographic reasons there is also an unrest and division between Islamism 
demanding a powerful role in state structure, and the secular liberals demanding a 
clear separation of state structures from Islamic tendencies (Freudenstein, 2011).   
 Meanwhile, as a regional country Israel has also been affected by the 
Arab Spring because with the Arab Spring, it has found itself in an unsecure 
atmosphere. For instance Hosni Mubarak as a leader having good relations with 
Israel has not been the authority in Egypt anymore, although the Muslim 
Brotherhood has followed a conciliatory approach so far related to Egypt’s peace 
treaty with Israel (Moller, 2012). Moreover in also Syria there has been a 
possibility that a Muslim Brotherhood supported government might come to power 
in the future, which would not be in the interest of Israel, as it happened in Tunisia 
and Libya as well.     
 Notwithstanding, the Arab Spring might be a genuine opportunity if it can 
accomplish and successfully reach its real targets like democracy, respect for 
human rights and economic welfare. It may finish the violence that has destroyed 
millions of lives since the Second World War like the Iran-Iraq war or Arab-Israeli 
conflict or some others involving Western powers. Furthermore at the end of it the 
peace and democratic order may finally come to the region (De Vasconcelos, 




4. The Arab Spring and Its Multidimensional Repercu ssions to   
Turkey and to the EU 
 
 While the uprisings have been still going on, beyond the regional 
players, international players have already started to seek to restrain threats and 
enhance their influences on the region. Since, none of the international actors may 
predict the long-term results of the events and their possible impacts on their 
society, on their economy and most importantly on their state security.  
 As pointed out my some scholars as Huntington “when authoritarian 
regimes fall, they sometimes give way to other authoritarian regimes rather than to 
liberal ones. Despite the developments of the last two years, certain structural 
factors will continue to block the spread of democracy in the Middle East” (Jones, 
2013). In this context, international actors having direct links with the region like 
the European Union and regional actors having international significance like 
Turkey, has to elaborate the foreign policy decisions towards the region with 
further caution after the Arab Spring. 
 Taking into account this general situation, firstly, the impact of the Arab 
Spring on Turkey, and Turkey’s regional policy, as well as on its international 
reputation should be elaborated in a depth. Moreover, the contradictions and 
opportunities emerged for Turkey after the awakening in the Middle East and 
North Africa should be scrutinized in order to predict its probable effects on 
Turkey-EU relations. Secondly, the same impact should be analyzed related to the 
European Union and on its foreign policy. When the impacts of the Arab Spring on 
the EU’s relations with the regional countries are scrutinized, two different 
perspectives, ‘political’ and ‘economic’, come into prominence.  
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4.1. Turkey’s Middle East Perception after the Arab  Spring: the 
End of the Zero Problems with Neighbors Policy 
 
 As for Turkey, the Arab Spring made a cold shower effect as stressed by 
Tocci (2012) particularly regards Turkey’s foreign policy optimism symbolizing the 
end of ‘the zero problems with neighbors’ policy. The policies followed by Turkey 
were mostly criticized regarding the Arab Spring since it was argued to react to the 
uprisings in a different way than the Western powers.  
 For instance in Libya, Turkey opposed NATO’s enforcement taking into 
account its commercial interests as an important commercial power whose well-
being was largely depending on exports and therefore who had to be mindful of its 
commercial interests and investments (Barkey, 2011).  
 However, Turkey eventually signed onto NATO taking over command 
and control of the no-fly zone, because its initial hesitation triggered some events 
in Libya for example some anti-Turkish demonstrators burned the Turkish flag and 
tried to invade Turkish diplomatic consulate. Although it took longer time for 
Turkey to reconcile itself to follow similar policies especially with the European 
Union about Libya and Syria, it finally came together with the European Union and 
the NATO to support the anti-authoritarian uprisings at least in principle (Tocci, 
2012).  
 Nevertheless, Turkey did not fully cooperate with UN-mandated efforts 
about Gaddafi such as freezing his assets (Barkey, 2011). According to Barkey 
(2011), tense situation between Turkey and Syria, as well as reactions from the 
West to Turkey’s initial policy towards Libya have showed that during the Arab 
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Spring Turkey should understand that it is on her benefit to be at the same side 
with the West.  
 By contrast with Libya, Turkey supported the uprisings in Egypt since the 
beginning, because of the strategic rivalry in between Turkey and Egypt and also 
because of the absence of large Turkish investments in Egypt (Taspinar, Barkey, 
Soler i Lecha, Nafaa & Tocci, 2011). Additionally, after the victory of Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and Muhammed Mursi’s term of presidency in the country, 
both countries are aware of the importance of a strategic partnership in order to 
reshape the regional order after the Arab Spring.  
 In doing so they need each other as both of them are the most significant 
and powerful countries having common strategic goals in the region especially 
against the bloodshed in Syria, the influence of oil nations in the Persian Gulf and 
future policies toward Israel, and so on. In this context, the new alliance emerging 
between Turkey and Egypt is of crucial importance as both of these countries 
have geostrategic significance in terms of the regions’ security, stability and 
prosperity. 
 Only recently it was observed that Turkey-Syria tension on the Turkish 
border and political-economic problems in Egypt has brought these two countries 
together (Arango, 2012; Fleishman, 2012). In fact, the rapprochement between 
two countries gave signals also in 2011 when Egyptian soldiers were killed at the 
Israeli border and after the Israeli embassy in Cairo stormed by Egyptians.  
 Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan had visited Egypt in order to submit its 
support as a regional power whose citizens were also killed by Israeli soldiers on 
the Gaza flotilla previous year. Above all, Turkish public diplomacy has been 
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indeed followed precisely by the Egyptians especially by the Egyptian elite, since 
its influence on Egyptian people was enormous.  
 Meanwhile, Turkey has stated at almost every occasion its support to 
Muslim Brotherhood and President Mohammed Mursi. As an indicator of this 
support, several economic assistance agreements have already been signed, 
initiatives to relax the visa requirements have started, and joint naval exercises in 
the Mediterranean were conducted (Ibid.; Turkone, 2012). 
 Probably the biggest repercussion of the Arab Spring for Turkey and its 
regional policies has been related to Syria. As stressed by Alessandri & Altunişik 
(2013), with the crisis in Syria, the incidents of Arab Spring arrived at Turkey by 
posing direct threats to its security and raising policy challenges.  
 As a political response, the AKP government applied to the contact of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to facilitate political developments inside Syria in addition 
to the official talks in between Turkish and Syrian governments. Afterwards, 
Turkey had to impose an economic embargo, direct support for to the opposition, 
as well as threatening Assad by using military force against the regime. 
 Of course the shooting down of a Turkish jet by Syria in 2012 triggered 
the tense atmosphere in between the countries; nevertheless there was no 
immediate reaction against Syria from Turkish side afterwards not to escalate the 
already negative situation.  
 Meanwhile, a refugee camp was built in Turkey and according to the 
United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR)’s April 2013 statistics 291.996 Syrian 
refugees have been staying in this camp (see UNHCR official web site, 2013). 
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 In a nutshell, it should be stated that the Arab Spring has brought about 
a number of contradictions as well as opportunities for Turkey and its relations 
with the European Union. As for the opportunities, there is no doubt that Turkey is 
becoming ever more integrated with its neighbors and this approach empowers its 
influence in the Middle East.  
 Indeed, by seeing the positive role it has to play not only in the Middle 
East but also in Europe and Central Asia, Turkey is beginning to realize its full 
potential as a multiregional and increasingly powerful international actor (Walker, 
2012). In terms of political geography, Turkey is incrementally taking a leading role 
and is consolidating its strong position in the region.  
 In a fact, the Middle East policy has always been a priority for Turkey in 
shaping its foreign policy. Especially during the presidency of Justice and 
Development Party, this priority has been converted into a strategy aiming and 
seeking to extend connections with neighboring countries, and moreover, to 
establish a regional axis. However, “Ankara’s regional activism has backfired: from 
zero-problems with neighbors, we see neighbors’ problems spilling over into 
Turkey at an alarming rate” (Tocci & Bechev, 2012: 2). 
 Thus, Turkey is trying to transform the situation in the Middle East in the 
interest of itself as much as possible by stressing its role and importance in the 
region as moderate Islam model and as a neighbor country looking for closer 
relations. As stated by Barkey (2011), reconstruction process of the Middle East 
will take a long time and will necessitate a new domestic, regional, and 
international political and economic infrastructure, which should be shaped by 
Turkey with the help of the West.  
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 Owing to this, not surprisingly, the long-standing links with the US as an 
indispensable guarantor has been reinvested after a long-lasting divergence 
signals starting in 2003, but a similar rapprochement in relations with the EU has 
not been observed the blame of which, in large part, is at the Union’s door (Tocci 
& Bechev, 2012). 
4.2. The European Union needs renovation in its Mid dle East 
Policy 
 
 As explained in the previous chapters the Middle East and North Africa 
are the most important regions for the EU with their potential to create direct effect 
on the EU’s well-being in terms of economy and security. As far as the close 
economic relations in between the EU and the Middle Eastern countries are 
concerned, it should worth to say that “economic security is one of the important 
facets of the security for the EU since sustainable development, new and 
permanent markets and securing energy supplies are essential factors for 
economic security” (Dagci, 2007). 
 Besides the general importance of the region, the importance of Turkey 
as one of the prominent countries has been increasing for the European Union 
day by day. Cichocki (2009) explains this increasing importance in a connection 
with the Lisbon Treaty.  
 The Treaty has created much more security oriented atmosphere, and 
argues that after the changes taking place at the structure of the Union, Turkey 
has been seen through the “prism of a departure from the optimistic neoliberal 
paradigm of the 1990s, based on Western-centric propagation of economic and 
political norms, toward a more pessimistic and realistic geopolitical one” (Ibid.).  
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 Therefore, the EU has needed to redefine and reorganize its policy 
stance towards the region after the Arab Spring resulting from combination of 
demographic, economic and political factors.  
 Before the aforementioned events, the EU was encouraging cooperation 
with Arab rulers in order to ensure the regular supply of energy, to contain the 
spread of radical Islam, and to prevent illegal immigration (Stein, 2012). For 
instance, in the framework of its Mediterranean policies the EU had close relations 
with the western oriented Arab regimes provided that these regimes act as a 
bulwark against the rise of radical Islam and provide a measure of regional 
stability (Behr, 2012).  
 As a result of this, the Arab awakening forced the EU to assess the 
situation one more time from its existing foreign policy perceptions and come up 
with a new strategy. It also forced the EU to take some steps in coordination with 
the US, since it is argued by some scholars that there has been much to gain from 
cooperation both on the state level, and on the level of civil society (Freudenstein, 
2011). 
 For the European Union democracy promotion had always been one of 
the main central policies towards the neighboring countries, therefore when the 
first uprisings were started and swiftly spread all over the Northern Africa and 
subsequently to the Middle East with the demand of democracy, freedom and 
justice, the EU had pretended as if ‘Arab Spring’ was legitimizing their policies 
(Hollis, 2012).  
 However, the EU could hardly follow policies precisely supporting 
democracy because its security and economic well being had been priority in its 
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foreign policy interests. Despite of its declarations, agreements and statements 
related to the Barcelona Process which were stressing the importance of 
democracy and respect for human rights, its democracy assistance accounted for 
less than 0.5 percent of all aid to the region, while over 200 times more money has 
been allocated to economic restructuring programs (Malmvig, 2006). 
 The EU was late to react to the events of the Arab Spring at the 
beginning. There were few members, who were reacting immediately such as 
France and Italy, but their reaction was stemming from the security concerns 
about the refugee flows, not from democratic or humanitarian reasons.  
 During this period, a concrete political stance was expected against the 
authoritarian regimes trying to find out ways to eliminate uprisings, but instead of 
this, the EU prepared some technical arrangements and renovated its 
Neighborhood Policy as a foreign policy attitude.  
 Due to the internal problems occurring simultaneously in the EU, the 
Union was mainly focusing on the Greek bailout, the potential collapse of the 
Schengen system, and so on (Lecha, 2011).  
 This position of the European Union was stated also by European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle in 
his conference speech about the Arab Spring in Munich on 3 February, 2012. Füle 
(2012) pointed out with the following words: “Our policy in the region has not 
always been right. We have changed our approach and there is today much less 
tension between our interests and our values. However, we need a constant 




 Additionally, just at the end of 2010, Treaty of Lisbon has come into force 
amending the two treaties forming the constitutional structure of the Union which 
are the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(TEC).  
 With the Treaty of Lisbon, two new posts have been created in the 
Union, which are the High Representative of the ‘Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy’ and the service working under this post ‘European External Action 
Service (EEAS)’. By this way, the European Union would start to handle whole 
foreign affairs and security policy issues in coordination with and under control of 
these posts.  
 However, while these posts did not start to work properly and its manner 
of work did not completely clarified, protests against the economic crises arose 
and this evoked dissidence among the member states. Therefore, international 
society has one more time noticed that the European Union has not been so 
effective in foreign politics when the member states’ interests are being the 
subject. 
 Moreover, interests of member states, particularly the ones belong to the 
powerful members like Germany, the UK or France, are leading the Union’s 
foreign policy; not the Union itself. For example, depending on the financial 
connections at Egypt, for a long time these three countries did not want to actively 
involve in the events against Mubarek’s regime, and in several occasions they 
declared their oppositions against the religious regimes or leaders.  
 Both national policy decisions and French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s 
speeches about the Arab Spring, especially about Tunisia as being one of the old 
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colonies, at the beginning of the events in the region reflected this perspective 
(Küçükkeleş, 2013; Jeanjean, 2011). According to Jeanjean, “Sarkozy’s regime 
and France lived in the ignorance of issues affecting the people and the political 
powers on the other side of the Mediterranean. France did not understand what 
was happening because of the close ties existing between French regime and 
North African dictatorship” (Jeanjean, 2011).  
 Even if a bit late, the European Union responded to the Arab Spring 
through a series of different ways including in official visits, humanitarian aids, 
sanctions on migration, new initiatives improving neighborhood relations, and so 
on (Balfour, 2012). During the programming and implementation processes of the 
responses there was a close cooperation and collaboration with the African Union 
and the Arab League. 
 Mainly the EU’s revised policies about the southern neighborhood has 
focused around four titles which are “refined conditionality, greater differentiation 
among countries, new tools to support democracy-building, and a stronger focus 
on sustainable socio-economic development” (Ibid.). 
 Of course the first and most discussed EU response was related to 
military intervention in Libya because of either belated decision about it or division 
among the members as also observed in the case of invasion of Iraq.  
 European participation in the military initiative in Libya can be 
summarized like that; France, the UK, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Norway joined 
the bombing group, while the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden flew fighter patrols; 
and as for Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, they provided a naval presence 
(Witney & Dworkin, 2012).  
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4.2.1. Political Perspective: ‘EU Development Coope ration’ 
 The main foreign policy response of the European Union towards the 
Arab Spring was in the framework of its development cooperation policy. As one of 
the most well-known and active policy areas of the EU, it has been 
comprehensively discussed since the beginning of the Arab revolutionary wave.  
 From the EU’s Neighborhood Policy perspective, it provides a unique 
platform that facilitates mutual understanding and political dialogue in order to 
reduce tensions, whereas from the financial perspective it serves for the 
development of infrastructure network connections, regional economic integration, 
and protection of the environment and the establishment of a free trade zone. 
 In the framework of the first responses of the EU to the Arab Spring, 
according to the European Commission’s data, EUR 80.5 million in total was 
allocated to the region which covers emergency decision, humanitarian 
implementations, and evacuation of third country nationals (see European 
Commission official web site, 2011).  
 The first official response was the declaration of a joint communication 
named ‘A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean’ on 8 March, 2011. The general aim of the communication was to 
support the countries in the Southern Mediterranean who were making political 
and economic reforms, and to contribute them towards increasing human rights 
and freedoms. In this context, as the first step, EUR 30 million was made available 
for humanitarian aid by the Commission especially for the urgent situations in 
Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. 
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 On 25 May, 2011 the EU declared another join communication named as 
‘A new response to a changing Neighborhood’. With this document, the EU 
declared that the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, 
the more support it will get from the EU in various forms, including increased 
funding for social and economic development, larger programs for comprehensive 
institution-building, greater market access, and increased financing support for 
investments (see European Commission official web site, 2011).  
 Depending on the necessity of a strong civil society in creating ‘deep 
democracy’, the European Union has given special attention to the role of civil 
society in international politics. In this framework a Civil Society Facility was 
established including social media development. Additionally, Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) and political movements have gained much more 
importance than before in the eyes of the EU bureaucrats (Balfour, 2012).  
 In the following process, within the scope of ‘A new response to a 
changing Neighborhood’, in September 2011 a new program was adopted by the 
European Commission, the name of which was ‘Support for Partnership, Reforms 
and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)’. In the framework of this program it has been 
decided to provide support for the Southern Neighborhood countries regarding 
democratic transformation, institution building and economic growth through 
institution building programs.  
 Besides, they have been contributed for integrated socio-economic 
reform, strengthened labor market institutions, promoted labor market, capacity 
building activities, and pilot programs which were modeled on the EU cohesion 
and rural development policies (Karana, 2012).  
59 
 
 The total value of the initiative was EUR 350 million to cover the years 
2011 and 2012 (see European Commission official web site, 2011). According to 
the program, the EU member states have to be involved in the preparation of 
initiatives supporting them through their embassies and aid agencies that are 
active in partner countries.  
 The Erasmus Mundus Program can be another further step for the 
neighboring countries in the region in order to improve relations, which has 
adopted in September 2011. With the program it was planned to create 
opportunities for student and academic staff mobility although there is still fear in 
Europe of immigration from the South. 
 Almost all the new initiatives breaking new grounds to European 
Neighborhood Policy have anticipated close consultation and observation of the 
countries in the Middle East and Southern Mediterranean in order to follow the 
improvement process. However neither of the initiatives suggests any concrete 
plan concerning the content of the application and evaluation (Karana, 2012).  
 On the other hand, as stressed by Schumacher (2011), European 
Neighborhood Policy was hardly attractive for the authoritarian regimes of the 
region to make changes in their political systems and today after the Arab Spring 
nothing has changed that much, even though the intentions are also clearly the 
same from both sides which are that for the African countries they are money and 
market access in Europe; as for the Europeans they are stability and prosperity in 
Africa.   
 In fact, “the revision of the ENP was already decided in the second half 
of 2010’, for instance, ‘at a time when the EU and the regime of Tunisian President 
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Ben Ali were in the final phase of bilateral negotiations to award Tunisia ‘advanced 
status’, and Arab rebellion wasn’t even a theoretical consideration among planning 
staff in the Brussels institutions” (Schumacher, 2012). It can be even said  that the 
new initiatives about revising the ENP was not planned exactly for giving a 
response to the Arab Spring, at least at the beginning (Karana, 2012).  
 However, there are still possibilities and hopes to provide assistance to 
the regional countries after the Arab Spring as much as possible. Freudenstein 
(2011) has argued that especially the EU member states in Central and Eastern 
European countries can play an important role to lead the EU in its assistance 
policy towards the Arab Spring, because these countries had already experienced 
a transition from dictatorship to democracy, and from central planning to market 
economy.    
4.2.2. Economic perspective: ‘The EU and the MENA’   
 The economic relations with the European Union have a crucial 
importance for the Middle East and Northern African (MENA) countries, because 
more than fifty percent of their trade has been plied with the EU (Knoops, 2011). 
From the EU’s perspective this close connection has been taken as an advantage 
in terms of political security and energy security (mainly oil). Since, any political or 
economic unrest in this region can pave the way for fluctuations in prices of crude 
oil on the world markets as happened during the Iranian revolution (1979) and 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990).  
 In this context, after the Arab Spring, economic relations between the EU 
and MENA region have been attracted much more attention. However, there has 
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been another curial issue taking attention at the same time which is the financial 
problems of the European Union and its seeking to find a solution for this after the 
Treaty of Lisbon came into force.  
 Nevertheless, the EU has diversified its rescue packages and new 
initiatives mentioned under the European Neighborhood Cooperation section. 
However, through these policies it has been difficult to accomplish progress in 
trade anyway, as one of the main pillars of economic development in MENA 
region.  
 In fact, the EU has mostly criticized because of its confusing democracy 
promotion, its relations with traditional parts of civil society, few social investment 
projects on market liberalization, and also insufficient trade-openings and 
regulatory adjustments (Fabry, 2013).  
 Before helping to the recovery of the regional economies, the EU has 
been offering new incentives to the MENA countries such as mobility partnerships, 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) and so on. And even 
for these initiatives it has laid down some pre-conditions (Witney & Dworkin, 
2012). Moreover, the leverage of these initiatives are challenged by the influence 
of new actors in the region like the Gulf countries or China (Fabry, 2013) 
 The main reason behind this situation is explained by Kirişci (2012) that 
the EU represents a considerable resistance to opening its internal market to 
agricultural products from the region while continuing to import energy related 
products. This trade volume is mostly prolonged between the EU and Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia or Libya.  
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 Kirişci also emphasizes that especially the Mashreq countries (Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Egypt) have large trade deficits with the EU, 
because “these countries have imported much more from the EU compared to 
what they have been able to export in the absence of oil and natural gas exports”.  
 When the main drivers of the uprisings in the Middle East and North 
Africa are considered, socio-economic development factor is coming into 
prominence. This means that in the region, for a successful transformation, the EU 
and regional countries will need to find solutions together, firstly, for the poverty 
and unemployment. Especially the European Union will need to add new 
dimensions to its foreign policy towards the MENA region in terms of economic 
relations.  
 Although it does not seem realistic today, according to some scholars it 
might be expected the EU to offer the MENA countries, who are meeting 
necessary conditions in terms of relevant EU law, full accession to the EU single 
market by 2030.   
 According to the analyses of Sapir & Zachmann (2012: 45-46); “This 
would entail the progressive elimination of all barriers to the free circulation of 
goods, services, capital, and labor. (…) It would also include access to specific 
transfer mechanisms designed to foster and offset costs of economic, social, and 
environmental convergence. (…) If successful, the process would imply that, by 
2030, Europe and the Mediterranean countries would constitute a vast Euro-Med 
Economic Area (EMEA) similar to the present European Economic Area (EEA) 
that links the EU to Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein”.  
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 However, in order to carry out this foreign policy goal EU member states 
have to be willing and have to attempt for it. Balfour (2012: 31) mentions the calls, 
at the beginning of the uprisings, seeking for a “Marshall Plan for North Africa and 
the Middle East, and for breaking down trade protectionism, coupled with a race to 
get visibility in the region and at home through official visits to the uprising 
countries”.  
 Unfortunately she tells that none of those calls have been materialized 
and no initiative has been presented by the member states to take any further step 















5.  Implications of the Arab Spring on EU-Turkey Re lations:   
    ‘Cooperation or Competition’? 
 
 As explained with the causes and results in the previous chapters, the 
Arab Spring has forced the European Union and Turkey to update their 
approaches and policies to properly respond to the improvements of the Middle 
East and Northern Africa.  
 Although they had reacted similar to each other with a concern and 
doubt at the beginning of the uprisings and they had been reluctant to lose their 
rooted relations with the dictators of the old regimes, in the end they found 
themselves in a need to reconstruct their relations and come closer while 
regenerating their ties with the neighboring countries. 
 Security and stability have been the central necessities for the European 
Union since the foundation of the Union, although this main concern has changed 
its focus from the Soviet Union with the end of the Cold War towards the Middle 
East. In this context, promoting democracy and stimulating stability in the Middle 
East, with which the EU has close commercial and socio-cultural interactions, 
have crucial importance for the EU (Kirisci, 2011).  
 For all these aims, the European Union needs to understand more 
precisely the current trends of Islamic movements and to be more innovative when 
engaging with them, their varying  channels of communication and cooperation in 
neighbors’ civil societies (Fabry, 2013). Therefore, as a Muslim country located in 




 As explained in the previous chapters, there is a mutual interdependence 
in between Turkey and the EU in terms of national or supranational interests 
emerging from the Middle East. Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy decisions have been 
influenced by the relations with the European Union, while the European Union 
has been taking its decisions about Turkey also according to its own interests 
depending on the Middle East in which Turkey has located.  
 As stated by Walker (2007); “Turkey has historically prioritized its 
relationship with Europe; however the attractiveness of Turkish membership in the 
EU is undoubtedly linked to the constructive role it can play in its own near-
abroad”. Therefore, between 2009 and 2011, some scholars’ arguments on 
Turkey’s ‘change of axis’ and its ‘drift to the East’ took the first seat in internal and 
international agenda of the EU.  
 When the Arab Spring occurred at the end of 2010, the dynamics of 
relations between Turkey and its transatlantic partners, particularly the EU have 
changed once again in order to adequately respond to the specific needs of the 
new context,  and feasibility of acting together in the Arab world has hit the top 
(Tocci, 2012; Lecha, 2011).  
 In a similar vein to the European Union, Turkey had prolonged close 
relations with the old regimes of the Arab world until the Arab Spring without 
paying attention their un-democratic state structures. When the revolts started 
Turkey realized that it was confronted with the same dilemma faced by the 
European Union as being another promoter of democracy in the Middle East.  
 Thus similar to the EU, Turkey also preferred a pragmatic approach 
focusing on the amelioration of national interests such as cultivation of economic 
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ties and the expansion of political dialogue through diplomacy (Alessandri & 
Altunişik, 2013).  
 With this understanding, according to some scholars both Turkey and 
the EU shared common features while reacting to the events in the Middle East, 
because both of them lost their credibility due to the support they had provided for 
authoritarian regimes before the Arab Spring (France towards Tunisia and Libya, 
Turkey towards Syria and Libya), and both of them have demanded to keep their 
influential role in the region (Lecha, 2011).      
 In terms of providing security for the Mediterranean region, and in a 
roundabout way for the Europe in general, Turkey-EU rapprochement has also 
been important, because without this, as emphasized by Lecha (Ibid.) launching a 
mission in the framework of its Common Security and Defense Policy with using 
NATO military capabilities in the region or beyond will stayed blocked for the EU 
by Turkey due to Cyprus issue.        
 Energy dependency and its security has been also determinant in 
Turkey-EU relations. For the last couple of years, there has been a growing effort 
in the European Union to diversify its supply of energy (which is manly depended 
on Russia) (Souleimanov & Kraus, 2012). Simultaneously, there has been 
emerging energy cooperation in between Turkey and Iran regarding the transit of 
Iranian natural gas to the West.  
 This energy cooperation is conducted in addition to Turkey’s already 
established bounds with the neighbor countries providing more than half of the 
crude oil and natural gas supply of the world. Therefore, in the near future, most 
probably there will be new energy connections among the European Union and 
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the Middle East, and the lines of these connections will highly likely pass through 
Turkey.  
 Natural resources and energy supply have always been a crucial factor 
for national or supranational interests, however, today, this decisiveness is much 
more important than before. Because, the Middle East and North Africa as the 
main regions of energy supplies of the globe have been experiencing an uprising 
and struggling to reemerge its regional order and stability.  
 Thus it is difficult to predict the future success of these energy 
connections in advance. Therefore, the European Union is in a far more need to 
keep its relations with Turkey vibrant, and it has to take the Arab Spring as an 
advantage to improve its relations with both Turkey and other regional countries. 
 Turkey’s and the EU’s current approaches to the Middle East has often 
been described as a form of soft power but still there are some main divergences 
or differences between their positions and their powers in the region.  
 For instance, as summarized by Schmid (2011: 4), Turkey is an active 
economic power in the region relying on the solid nexus of interests between 
Turkish businessmen and the new political AKP elites and while materializing 
these interests “Turkey has taken advantage of the relative backwardness of Arab 
economies to make itself indispensable through the exportation of much needed 
goods, and proposed a free circulation integration model gravitating around its 
own territory”.  
 But the EU’s contribution to economic development is like a public donor, 
and also a producer of commercial norms (Ibid.). Moreover the EU does not allow 
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people from the region for free circulation in its borders while Turkey prefers to 
eliminate visa requirements from these regional countries in addition to the 
growing economic ties with them. After the Arab Spring the same attitude has 
been still followed by Turkey and the EU, with much more attention and doubts in 
the EU’s side stemming from the possible flows of migrants from the region.   
 Although close cooperation between the EU and Turkey in dealing with 
the challenges of the Arab uprisings have not been observed yet, there are some 
improvements in bilateral relations between Turkey and some EU member 
countries, particularly Great Britain and France related to the Syrian crisis, for 
instance.  
 In the United Nations Security Council resolutions related to violence in 
Syria, Turkey and France took the same side as active members of an 
international diplomatic effort that aimed to bypass the Russian and Chinese 
vetoes about Syria and they kept up pressure on Syria to comply with international 
demands to end violence against protests (Alessandri & Altunişik, 2013; Black, 
2011).  
 As a consequence, it should be stated that it is difficult to make exact 
judgments about the final situation of relations under the shade of Arab Spring and 
it is difficult to show concrete examples of agreement or disagreement between 
Turkey and the European Union in their Middle East policies. However, there is no 
doubt that both sides have faced with challenging outcomes.  
 Although their responses to the “Arab Spring” have been based on the 
general idea that the transformation of the Arab world is leading to more 
democratization; when it comes to their interest, both have had difficulties in 
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understanding the complexities and specificities of this transformation (Alessandri 
& Altunişik, 2013).  
 Taking into account the intimate relationship that Turkey and Arab 
countries had in the recent past, it will not be wrong to state that there has been a 
pressure on Turkey much more than the EU since the beginning of the uprisings to 
react the events officially as a rising power and a facilitator to solve the crises in 


















 In the light of all these events and changing foreign policy perceptions 
and tense relations, the proper answer to the basic question of this research ‘how 
EU-Turkey relations will be effected’ is still remaining as a main concern, due to 
the fact that Arab Spring started at a time when Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union was going through a turbulence.  
 Although there are so many scholars who have affirmative expectations 
(such as Alessandri & Altunişik, 2013; Fabry, 2013; Behr, 2012; Barkey, 2011; 
Freudenstein, 2011; Jenkins, 2011; Taspinar, Barkey, Soler i Lecha, Nafaa, & 
Tocci, 2011) from the Arab Spring for the EU-Turkey relations, after two years 
nothing has clearly changed.   
 Today, from the EU’s perspective, it seems that it is significant to provide 
better governance and democratization in the Arab world so as not only to 
preserve economic bounds with the region but also to protect itself from the most 
probable negative repercussions of unsecure environment of the region (Moller, 
2012; Freudenstein, 2011). Therefore, sustaining close contact and cooperation 
with Turkey as a model of ‘moderate’ Islam is very important (Barkey, 2011).  
 In this case, this time another question is coming to mind which is 
whether Turkey is a real role model in the eyes of regional countries which would 
positively affect the EU to keep closer ties with Turkey in the near future after the 
Arab Spring. In this framework, a study conducted by TESEV (Turkish Economic 
and Social Studies Foundation) in 2011 in order to understand the perception of 
Turkey in the Middle East is giving very interesting feedbacks shedding light to 
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some questions about not only aforementioned issue but also some others 
emerging from the region (Akgün & Senyücel Gündoğar, 2012).  
 The study is conducted as a survey in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Tunisia, the Gulf countries (Qatar, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE), Yemen and Libya.  
 According to the survey, economic situation is seen as the most urgent 
issue of these countries, while the uprisings in the region in general is evaluated 
as the second most important issue. As for the third most important issue, people, 
who are attending the survey, are designating the Western influence/presence, 
whereas the previous years’ mostly preferred issue ‘the Israeli-Palestinian issue’ is 
lagging behind in the row.  
 About the regional security, according to the study Turkey is seen as the 
country that is playing the most positive role being to a great and moderate extent, 
and the responses of respondents regarding the same issue are not so negative 
even in Syria. About the impact of European Union on regional security and peace 
is also seen positive in general except Syria, Iran and Iraq.  
 Meanwhile, Turkey’s response to the Arab Spring in the first months has 
a positive impact on respondents according to the study, although in general 
evaluation of Turkey’s stance, there are some clear differences than the previous 
years, such as while in 2010 the most favorable view of Turkey in the region was 
belong to Syria, in 2011 there is a sharp decrease in this percentage in not only 
Syria but also in Iran. But on the contrary, there is an increase in positive attitudes 
towards Turkey in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  
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 Similarly, in the results of the survey, there is an obvious support for 
Turkey to play a greater role in the region and to mediate in the regional conflicts 
like Israeli-Palestinian issue. Finally to our main question whether Turkey is a 
model for the region or not, 61% of respondents are giving a positive response, 
because of its democratic system, growing economy, Muslim background and 
secular system.   
 One more issue is worth to be mentioned here from the survey which is 
the regional opinions about Turkey’s EU membership. In this issue, more than half 
of the respondents are giving positive feedbacks, most of which are coming from 
Libya and Egypt. From the other way around 60% of respondents are saying that 
Turkish accession would have a positive effect on the EU‘s role in the region.  
 Özerdem (2011) is also mentioning these Arab opinions related to 
Turkey, its role and its relations with the West in one of her papers related to 
Turkey’s role as a bridge between the Middle East and Europe. In her paper she is 
referring to the analyses of Hasan Kanbolat, who is the Director of Center for 
Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, and pointing out his opinions that neighboring 
countries are seeing Turkey as a European country and culturally they feel Turkey 
close to themselves but at the same time, close to Europe. So if Turkey becomes 
closer to Europe this means the Middle East becomes closer to Turkey. 
 Similar results can also be seen in 2011 Euromed Survey related to the 
Arab Spring with some slight differences. In this survey, according to 695 actors 
and experts, two actors receive an average score of more than 5 who are Turkey 
(5.9) and the European Union (5.4) in terms of their reactions to the uprisings. 
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However, according to the same survey respondents expect a lesser impact of the 
EU and Turkey in the region in the future (Aragall & Padilla, 2012).   
 The influence, which is given to Turkey, changes depending on the 
respondents’ countries. For instance the lowest ratings of respondents are 
observed in the Maghreb. 56% of respondents in Maghreb countries believe that 
the EU will have more influence in the region in the coming days, while 
respondents from the Mashreq and Turks themselves placed it on a level with the 
EU (Ibid.) with a contrast like 57% of respondents from Mediterranean EU 
countries’ belief that Turkey will have more influence than the EU. 
 As from Turkey’s perspective, Turkey is of course not so strong and 
powerful enough to respond all the regional, military and economic requirements 
in the region by itself although it argues the opposite from time to time. Moreover, 
it is much more difficult than ever today to follow Monroe’s isolation doctrine 
especially for a country located at the very center of the Balkans, the Middle East, 
the Caucasus and Mediterranean. In fact, it is much more difficult to follow a single 
acting policy reflecting eastward or westward tendencies only. 
 Additionally, the awakening is triggering a shift in regional balance of 
power, which is basically urging Turkey to analyze and rearrange its foreign policy 
in the region as well (Barkey, 2011), no matter how positive its reputation among 
the regional societies. In this context, in order to respond to the requirements of 
the new political situation in the Arab world adequately, as pointed out by the 
existing literature, Turkish foreign policy has to be modified together with the 
European policies, which is expected also by the regional societies as observed in 
the above mentioned study. 
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 As an integral part of its existence, Turkey has traditionally put “Europe” 
at the very centre of its policies both internally and externally as an entity, an 
identity, and as the set of common values since the foundation of the republic. The 
ninety years-old history of this prioritization has been prolonged with up and 
downs and with pros and cons. During these years, this pro-Western/pro-
European attitude has gained official character through the steps taken mutually 
by Turkey and the European Union with the membership bid.   
 It is a very well-known fact that this process has created a unique 
interdependence in between Turkey and the European Union no matter how big 
the frustration of Turkey stemming from the recent stagnation in relations and the 
fear of Europe stemming from Turkey’s eastward refocus. 
 Today, almost all the scholars are agree on Turkey’s role as an 
important partner in terms of economy as well as security as explained in depth in 
the previous chapters, even though this significance has usually been elaborated 
in its own reality. From the Turkish perspective, it might seem that it is necessary 
to keep better connection with the East due to the security and stability concerns, 
in addition to the rapidly growing Turkish economy requiring the energy resources 
of the East.  
 However, it has also to be accepted that Turkey will anyway be in a need 
for the West, particularly for the European Union, as a stabilizing factor for the 
domestic changing process in the Middle East and North Africa, too, firstly in terms 
of international support, strong recognition and as well as modern technology to 
use. On the other hand it has to take the advantage of Eastern resources and 
markets to offer Turkish products worldwide (Cichocki, 2009).   
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 Above all, it should be accepted that Turkey is changing, but the 
European Union is changing, too, either politically or financially. Nevertheless, the 
foreign policy perceptions towards the common neighborhood of Turkey and the 
European Union are becoming convergent day by day. As long as the international 
politics and political events occurring in this neighborhood make a common stance 
necessary in order to provide security and stability, this convergence will continue.  
 The Arab Spring has been the last but not the least example of this 
convergence, although it is still impossible to mention an exact common attitude 
towards the Middle East and North Africa as being one of the main common 
neighborhoods depending on close bilateral relations, negotiation and 
collaboration.  
 Almost in every paper written about the Arab Spring, or every research 
analyzing the repercussions of the Arab Spring on Turkey-EU relations, the Middle 
Eastern policies have been mentioning as the potential of cooperation between 
these actors, but unfortunately none of them have been able to predict any 
political initiative because of the absence of effective permanent channels of 
dialogs, as well as quick change of state policies in the European Union and also 
in Turkey.       
 Exceptionally, some scholars like Alessandri and Altunişik (2013) have 
suggested the EU to accept to work more closely with Turkey in the region, by 
pursuing common diplomatic initiatives while developing joint concrete projects on 
the ground. They have also added that “(…) thanks to its historical legacies, 
cultural affinities, and growing economic ties with many of the region’s players 
both in the Levant, Gulf and North Africa, Turkey could help the EU develop a 
76 
 
common vision of a global Mediterranean, ever more connected to neighboring 
regions, in which the EU’s and Turkey’s influence would be measured not so much 
in terms of alignment of these regions with the European (or Turkish) space, but 
with the ability to protect the interests and values that both Turkey and the EU 
share, from economic openness to political development, despite the growing 
diversity and multipolarity of the region” (Ibid..: 8).  
 The supporters of Turkey’s membership to the European Union have 
been also strongly continuing to argue that this partnership can provide strategic 
benefits for both sides. “Outside the EU, Turkey will be increasingly induced to ‘go 
it alone’ in terms of both its domestic development and foreign policy, which would 
hollow out the strategic assets embedded in any EU-Turkish foreign policy 
cooperation. It is only if such an argument is made persuasively that Turkey's 
neighborhood policy would represent a net asset in the pursuit of Turkey's 
accession to the EU” (Tocci, 2011: 80). 
 Similarly, Nykänen (2011) argues that it is thought that Turkey’s 
membership to the European Union will be a logical end result and it will be the 
benefit of the EU, unless they follow diverging policies in the Middle East. He 
thinks that an opposite situation may create further problems among the European 
Union member countries.  
 Beyond the foreign policy and security oriented opportunities that will be 
gained by both sides, “Turkey’s strong and growing economy offers a large and 
important market for European goods and services even as Turkey’s economy 
turns more to the greater Middle East. Turkish businesses are flourishing in parts 
of Europe and Turkey has become a magnate for foreign direct investment with 
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much of that flowing from Europe. Turkey’s role as an important energy hub and 
transit region for European energy security continues to grow” (Morelli, 2013: 13). 
 Another point of view stated by Jenkins (2011: 16) that “in a world 
increasingly driven by what the late Samuel Huntington described as 
“civilizational” divides, Turkey’s cultural ambidexterity – its strong sense of Muslim 
identity and its long history of close political, economic and societal ties with the 
West – means that it does genuinely offer the EU something that no other member 
or candidate can provide”.  
 These and slightly different or similar opinions were always put forward 
in the past whenever Turkey’s membership to the European Union was in the 
agenda. But, it had never been discussed that much deeply before the Arab 
Spring, and it had never become that much significant before when the Middle 
East was the main subject. It is because of the general alteration in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and also of the particular alterations in each country and in 
their regimes.  
 However, although it has been argued by some that the Arab Spring will 
serve to the benefit of supporter group by creating a rapprochement between 
Turkey and the EU through opening the ways going to the membership blocked by 
France and Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus; the findings of this research 
does not submit too much positive results at least for the near future, until a 
concrete step will be taken by the EU.  
 The European Union should realize that despite the interdependence 
between Turkey and the European Union, if the relations between Turkey and the 
EU related to Turkey’s membership continue to deteriorate, Turkey will certainly 
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turn its face to the other directions and will go its own way (Taspinar, 2011), 
depending on the Turkish societal alterations. And this final situation might not be 
for the benefit of the EU, especially when the existing political and financial 
discomfiture in the EU is concerned.  
 As emphasized by Lehne (2011), in this period, particularly after the 
Treaty of Lisbon the European Union and its new institution European External 
Action Service needs a strong leadership in order to take more strong decisions 
and to set priorities through modernizing its dialogue with the international 
partners like Turkey.   
 Indeed, the positive end result of mutual cooperation has also depended 
on Turkey’s responsibility. Although it seems that the importance of the EU has 
lost its credibility in Turkey and the self-confident AKP government now tends to 
underestimate the positive value of its engagement with the EU for its Middle East 
policy; Turkey is aware of gains that the rapprochement with the EU would 
provide.  
 They can be summarized as “institutionalized instruments to deal with 
some of the most pressing regional challenges, from economic development to 
political transitions, which call for financial instruments, multilateral initiatives, and 
standardized procedures” (Alessandri & Altunişik, 2013: 8). Thus, it will most 
probably not totally depart from the EU path in the following years.    
 Meanwhile, taking into account the last events and increased tension 
between Turkey on one side and Syria and Israel on the other side, it should be 
stated that a strengthening partnership between Turkey and Egypt, underpinning a 
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new order in the region, will most probably bring about new dynamics into the 
Middle East. 
 Thus it is understandable that the countries like Syria, Israel, and Iran in 
the region are looking upon the potential Turkish-Egyptian axis with an alarm; 
mainly because whereas only a short time ago these two countries were looking at 
each other with skepticism and suspicion, today they are progressing on a 
regional strategic partnership (Shadid, 2011).  
 For instance, as expected and actually observed during the first two 
years of the events in the Arab world, the Turkey-Egypt axis represents the most 
important aspect of the general trend wherein they try to alter and end the Israel’s 
military operations in Gaza (Turkone, 2012).  
 Now not only the regional powers but also all international actors have to 
re-evaluate their foreign policy perspectives towards the region, because of the 
fact that the general order established by the former authoritative regimes has 
been changing, and instead of these regimes, political Islamic figures are coming 
to the administrative level like Muslim Brotherhood.  
 In this atmosphere Turkey is seen as “a successful combination of a 
conservative traditional Islamic society with a modern economy open to the 
outside world and democratic institutions” (Fabry, 2013). And so, the European 
Union needs to share both this positive attitude and also Turkey’s expertise of the 
region.  
 But, on the other hand, Turkey is losing its credibility in some countries 
as well such as Iran which is the most powerful regional country with its nuclear 
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capabilities. And also when the internal turmoil and domestic evolutions are 
concerned it would not wrong to say that it is not in a position to bring about a 
successful modernization and democratization of the Arab world by itself and 
requires active support from the West. “The Arab spring is thus sending Turkey 
back towards the Western sphere” (Ibid.).   
 Taking into considerations of the general circumstances in the Turkey-
EU-Middle East triangle, it can be said as a consequence that Turkey-EU relations 
cannot be analyzed without taking deeply into account the common interests, 
common threats and common expectations from the international relations. In this 
context, the Arab Spring has brought about both challenges and opportunities for 
Turkey and for the European Union.   
 It has revealed the weaknesses of these international actors while 
requiring further intensified and comprehensive foreign policy tools in order to 
eliminate shared problems in the shared neighborhood. 
 There is no doubt that the fifty years old European Union membership 
voyage of Turkey does not seem to be ended affirmative just because of the 
uprisings dramatically shaking the Middle East and North Africa. However, seeking 
for comprehensive strategic cooperation in the common neighborhood, and the 
necessity of compensating each other’s weaknesses for the same foreign policy 
goal has created a rapprochement in between Turkey and the European Union.  
 The repercussions of this rapprochement has not been reflected to 
Turkey’s membership negotiation process yet, however, because of the fact that 
the foreign bilateral relations of these two international actors have been based on 
a structure which is build on a much more strong mutual-interdependence than 
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just a ‘membership’ relations. Even though there have been some differences as 
mentioned in the previous chapters related to their Middle East policies in general, 
and their policies after the Arab Spring in particular; their foreign policy stance 
towards the Middle East and North Africa cannot be evaluated as a complete 
divergence.      
 As a conclusion, if we look back at the hypotheses of this research, first 
of all, we can easily confirm that Turkey’s changing active Middle East policy, 
especially after the AKP’s presidency led to a significant rapprochement between 
Turkey and the regional countries such as Libya, Syria, and/or Egypt. And this 
rapprochement has been going on even after the Arab Spring with some slight 
obstacles except Syria.  
 As it is argued by the second hypothesis, Turkey’s voice is much higher 
than before in the negotiations with the European Union depending on Turkey’s 
good neighborly relations in addition to the economic relations with the countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey has never had that strong self 
confidence before this period. 
 By taking into account the surveys mentioned above and also general 
existing situation in international politics of the EU, for the third hypothesis it can 
be state that Turkey’s new foreign policy decisions and rapprochement with the 
Middle East has for sure affected the perception of the European Union about 
Turkey. Particularly, when the Arab Spring is concerned, it is obvious that it has 
created a positive rapprochement from the EU’s side to Turkey’s support and 




 The repercussions of regional disorder and prolonging conflicts in the 
MENA region is not for the benefit of the EU, but on the contrary it might pave the 
way for uncontrollable migration and Islamist movements in its own borders which 
are not moderate. 
 However, it should also be stated that the last hypothesis has not clearly 
been justified yet. Because the Arab Spring has also created some negative 
situations for Turkey in addition to the positive ones such as the difficulties and 
obstacles for providing neutrality, good-neighborly relations with all neighbor 
countries, and soft power perceptions of Turkey. For instance, deteriorating 
relations with Iran and Syria are direct effects of the Arab Spring on Turkey which 
might cause a decrease in Turkey’s growing reputation, power and voice in the 
international platforms.  
 Without a doubt, it has also been affecting Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union, since the growing security concerns in the country has also 
postponed the democratization and westernization process of Turkey in the 
framework of the EU-membership negotiation requirements. These security 
concerns have also triggered some reflections in the EU which have been already 
argued that Turkey’s membership in the EU might cause a security gap for Europe 
because of Turkey’s problematic neighborhood.   
 Nevertheless, the affirmative outcomes of both Turkey’s Middle East 
policy and Arab Spring-Turkey-EU triangle seem to be militating against a 
divergence between Turkey and the EU, based on the expectations particularly 
emerging from the MENA region regarding Turkey’s EU membership and good 
neighborly relations through Turkey between MENA countries and the EU.  
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 Of course this perception has reflected European, Middle Eastern and in 
a limited proportion Turkish side. When the AKP’s side is concerned (not 
completely of whole Turkish citizens, since it is difficult to accept that AKP has 
represented all citizens’ point of views), it is quite ambiguous to predict the course 
of Turkey-EU relations depending on the Arab Spring because of their every day 
changing domestic and foreign policy attitudes as mentioned in the previous 
chapters, although the general situation of international relations requires a 
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